University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1989

Qazaqjylyq| Nationalism and revolution in Kazakhstan, 1900-1920
Lyn R. Fisher
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Fisher, Lyn R., "Qazaqjylyq| Nationalism and revolution in Kazakhstan, 1900-1920" (1989). Graduate
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 3337.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3337

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT IN WHICH COPYRIGHT
SUBSISTS. ANY FURTHER REPRINTING OF ITS CONTENTS MUST BE
APPROVED BY THE AUTHOR,
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
DATE:
1 9 8 9

QAZAQJYLYQ:
NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN KAZAKHSTAN,
1900-1920

By
Lyn R. Fisher
B.A., University of Montana, 1979

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
University of Montana
1989

Approved by:

Chairman, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

1

-7—
_
t/
Date

/•*

77
//

"J $
er*- / i

^

: /} P Cf
/ f ;) /
f
'—

UMI Number: EP34335

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

OiMsrtatfcm Publishing

UMI EP34335
Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Fisher, Lyn R., M.A., July 1989

History

Qazaqjylyq: Nationalism and Revolution in Kazakhstan,
1900-1920 (215 pp.)
Director:

Frederick Skinner

The purpose of this study was to analyze the development of
modern nationalism by the Kazakhs of northern Central Asia at this
time. The Russian empire conquered and colonized Kazakhstan in
the 1800s. The Kazakhs were traditional pastoral nomads. They had
developed a unique "nomad nationalism,11 a powerful self-identity as
"free riders of the Steppe." Russian rule imposed modernization on
the Kazakhs. By the late nineteenth century, Kazakh nomadism was
declining rapidly. A small Kazakh educated elite arose due to the
introduction of modern education. As the Kazakh nomad masses grew
more desperate, the intellectuals sought to prevent the complete
destruction of Kazakh culture. Russian colonization flooded the
Steppe.
The Kazakh intellectuals were compelled to develop rapidly. Just
as they were coalescing, the educated elite was confronted by the
turmoil of Russia 1 s revolutionary era. Between 1900 and 1920, the
Kazakh intellectuals transformed from social reformists to democratic
nationalists to revolutionaries. That transformation, and the
dynamic relations between the Kazakh secular intellectuals, religious
reformists, and traditional leadership, against the background of the
Russian revolutions, is one theme of this study; the goal is to
provide perspective on modernization of nomads, as well as to
contrast modern and nomad nationalism.
This study is based on exhaustive research into English-language
sources. Russian and Kazakh sources in translation were utilized
extensively as well. The intention was to synthesize the scholarly
findings in this field. The bibliography is intended as a detailed
research tool in the study of pastoral nomads, particularly the
Kazakhs, modernization, and nationalism.
The transliteration system is based on that of the Library of
Congress, modified to achieve consistency due to the peculiar
history of Kazakh orthography. All dates to 1917 are Old Style,
thirteen days behind the modern calendar; New Style chronology
begins with 1918.
This study of Kazakh nationalism in the revolutionary era
provides useful perspective regarding pastoral nomadism in the
modern world.
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INTRODUCTION

Modern Kazakh nationalism arose in the latter 1800s, from the
consolidation of tsarist rule, intense Russian colonization, and the
influence of modern education and Western ideas.

The Russians crushed

armed resistance by the nomadic Kazakhs by the mid-1800s.
was gripped by the forces of modernization.

Kazakh society

Kazakh thinkers were

enveloped by Russian cultural developments and their world became
ordered by Russian definitions.

There arose naturally two clashing

perspectives between bitter anti-Russian hostility and the desire for
the opportunities of westernization.
Thus, from the outset, the Kazakh intelligentsia was split between
those who opposed all Russian, thereby Western, socioeconomic changes,
who are characterized as "traditionalists," and those who sought to
advance the Kazakh nation via Russian, that is, Western, progress, who
are termed "westernizers."
By the early twentieth century, this dichotomy developed into
opposition between traditionalist nationalists and progressive
westernists.

A third element was Islam, itself split between reformists

and conservatives, and the related pan-Turkist idealists.

The Kazakh

intellectual leaders were divided by perspective but all shared deeply
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the goal of a modern Kazakh nation, Qazaqjylyq.

These first Kazakh

nationalists were few in number but very significant politically.

In the

dozen years prior to World War I, they matured swiftly in their
nationalism.

By the time of the Russian revolutions, the Kazakh

intellectual leaders were divided between westernists who included
class-struggle in their outlook and nationalists distressed by the
ethnocultural struggle between Kazakh nomad and Russian colonist.
Yet another fracture-line appeared in this period, that between the
Kazakhs of the northern steppe and those of the southern desert-mountain
region.

The northern Kazakhs were much more experienced with the Russian

invaders.

The southern Kazakhs were enmeshed in the sedentary culture of

Turkestan.

The northern Kazakhs tended to be more nationalistic and

Russified, while the southern Kazakhs were much more anti-Russian and
pan-Islamic.

In cruder form, these characteristics applied to the

general population as well as the educated elite.
During the revolutions, the Kazakh intelligentsia fragmented along
these major faults and therefore they never presented a united front, but
rather a complex amorphousness.

The great majority of Kazakhs were barely

aware of the ideological struggle in their desperate battle to survive
the wrenching blows of modernization upon their nomadic culture and
economy.

The intellectuals were divided by too many variant forces —

inter-tribal rivalries, religious attitudes, class-consciousness,
regionalism, educational differences — that they shifted from camp to
camp during the civil war in response to the complicated dynamics of
Russians versus natives, Whites versus Reds, liberals versus extremists,
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pan-Turkists versus national autonomists versus federalists, and, not
least, nomads versus sedentes.

In the end, those Kazakh intellectuals

who resisted the Soviet triumph were destroyed, while those who
compromised with the Bolsheviks for their people's sake were eliminated
when their stewardship was no longer needed.

Independent Kazakh

nationalism flowered and withered within a single lifetime.

CHAPTER ONE
The Free Horsemen of the Steppe

Are your livestock and your soul still healthy?
— Traditional Kazakh greeting.

The Kazakhs were one of the last great nomadic peoples of the modern
age.

Pastoral nomadism evolved in relation to its natural environment,

in contrast with the civilized pattern of conquering the land.

Sedentary

societies thus relegate nomads to the primitive world, desiring to save
them by settling them.

Pastoral nomads detest civilization with a

.
2
fervent belief in the spiritual supremacy of nomadism.

These opposing

prejudices have always colored the historical interactions of nomads with
the civilized world, and even more so the study of nomads by scholars.
The student of nomadism must seek to appreciate, as much as possible, the
deep attachment of the nomad to his lifestyle.

One begins with the bases

of Kazakh life: their land and their traditional culture.
The modern Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan covers more than
one million square miles, measuring two thousand miles east to west and
3
one thousand miles north to south.

Roughly the size of the American

West or western Europe, it sprawls between China and Europe, stretching
from the 55th to the 40th parallels.

4

It is the domain of the Steppe.

5

The physical boundaries of the Kazakh domain were the Volga River
and Caspian Sea, on the west, the Siberian taiga to the north, the
Turanian desert lowlands of the south, and on the east, the uprearing
mountain systems of the Tien Shans and Altais.

Within this area one

discerns three broad vegetative zones and five physiographic provinces.
The severe continental climate of inner Asia dominates Kazakhstan and
largely determines its soil-regions.

The northern third is covered with

Siberian taiga, wooded steppe (on black-earth soils), and feather-grass
steppe (on chestnut soils), the middle third is semi-desert scrub
grasses and the saksaul tree (on chestnut and brown soils), and the
southern third is true desert (clay, sand, stony brown soils).

Alpine

4
vegetation occurs only on the eastern and south-eastern margins.
The northern plains form the first topographic region.

Because of

its fertile soils, the Russians came to call it "the Virgin L a n d s . T h e
central part of Kazakhstan is formed by an uplands region larger than
Texas or Britain and France combined.

It is a picturesque land of rugged

hills and tablelands, rolling grass, numerous lakes and small,
intermittent streams, and low, isolated, pineclad mountains.

Varying in

elevation from one to four thousand feet, it is the eroded remnant of an
extensive mountain system, and is enormously wealthy in nonferrous
minerals.

Perhaps the historic heartland of central Eurasia's nomads,

it has borne many names:

Desht-i-Kipchak by early Arab writers, Kirghiz

Steppe by Western cartographers after the tsarist style, the "Low Hills"
or "folded country" or "undulating plain" by Soviet geographers, and
Sary-Arka by the Kazakhs themselves.^

6

The western lowlands are the desert plains rising northward from
the desolate Caspian into the Uralian uplands, from which descend the
Volga and Ural rivers.

These lowlands merge into the vast southern

deserts which sweep from the Ust-Urt, between the Caspian and Aral seas,
to the sands of the Kyzyl-Kum, embracing the Syr Darya river, to the
Bet Pak Dala, "Steppe of Misfortune," west of Lake Balkhash, and the
deserts of Dzungaria between the Altais and Tien Shan, giving onto the
Gobi wastes.
The highland systems of the south—the Tien Shan and Pamir Knot
beyond—and of the east—the Altai and others—are vast.

They nourish

the major rivers of Central Asia, the Syr and Amu Daryas, and the Hi
River, which descends from the Tien Shan with numerous other streams to
fall into Lake Balkhash.

On the fertile piedmont soils of this region

arose the extremely ancient sedentary cultures, the so-called oasis
civilization of (western or Russian) Turkestan.

The great deserts

separate the northern nomads from the southern sedentes, both physically
and culturally.

However, the Ili basin is situated both between the

steppe and mountains, and athwart the ancient east-west passages in the
Altai-Tien Shan barrier.

Because of its fertility it attracted farmers

and towns, but its location attracted migrating nomad tribes and marching
armies.

This region was very important to the Kazakhs, who called it

Dzheti Su (Jetisu), or Seven Rivers; the Russians translated this into
g
Semirechye.
It is apparent that Kazakhstan is the central sector of the Steppe,
which stretches from the plains of Hungary to Manchuria.

This vast,
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semi-arid, isolated wilderness created and nurtured pastoral nomadism.
Civilization first appeared in Central Asia some five thousand years ago,
9
on the southwest border with Iran.

Pastoralism arose a few millenia

later, and pastoral nomadism itself only developed some time between
2000 and 1000 B.C.^

The origins of nomadism are still disputed, but

the obvious pre-requisite was the development of animal husbandry and
particularly the domestication of the horse.

The most likely scenarios

(for nomadism probably developed independently in several areas) involved
sedentary herdsmen exploiting the vast pastures of the Steppe until some
catalyst urged them to abandon their settled villages for the mobile life
of the stepnik.^

Once it appeared, the pastoral nomadic culture swept the

Steppe with a distinctive lifestyle and spiritual character which, in its
broadest form, has dominated the grasslands throughout history, until the
modern day.

Specific customs varied, but not the environmental realities

(or "subsistence factors") of their nomadic life.

The Scythians are more

like the Kazakhs than unlike; even the Cossacks were transformed by the
Steppe.

12

The nomads lived entirely on their herds.
shelter were their basic necessities.

13

Pasture, water, and

Despite the vastness of the

Steppe, grass was sparse and seasonal, water scarce or absent, and
shelter on the treeless plains was found only in stream-valleys.
and blizzards were catastrophic.

Drought

Most dreadful was the dzhut, in Kazakh,

the thaw which melts the snow and the freeze which ices the grass.
Entire herds, and the people who lived by them, were wiped out.

14

Pastoral nomadic migration implies neither footloose wandering nor
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"voortrekking."

Herding large numbers of grazing animals upon whom one's

existence absolutely depends is a crucial calculation of the benefits of
new pasture versus the debilities of exhaustion and weight-loss, storms,
predators, and wastelands.

The Steppe could provide only so much

pasturage, it had a very finite and fluctuating carrying capacity, and
this had to be parcelled out in large areas to small groups.

Dramatic

notions of mobs of nomads thundering over the plains like a flood are
thus purely romantic.

The stark exigencies of natural environment always

precluded great numbers or density of nomadic herdsmen; the extensive
nature of their lifestyle accounts for much in the pastoral nomadic
economy, culture, and psychology.
During the summer, the nomads divided into small family groups
which scattered the herds over the available pasturage.

In winter, the

groups gathered into extended family-communities which settled in one
(usually) traditional locale for the long season.
of horses, sheep, goats, and camels.

Their herds consisted

Horned cattle were poorly fit for

nomadic living, and were insignificant in the "pure" nomad economy.
The Kazakhs were horsemen par excellence.

They never used horses as

draft animals (though they sometimes rode cattle), whereas the relatively
few "snow" camels they had were strictly beasts of burden.

Oxen (and

yaks) hauled the heavy, two-wheeled carts which carried the nomads' home
and possessions when moving from camp to camp.

The nomad dwelling was

the ingenious yurt (Russian kibitka, Kazakh ui), wind-proof, dry,
portable, yet comfortable and even elegant in simplicity.

This conical-

roofed, round-walled felt tent symbolizes the entwined practicality and
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artistry that distiungish nomad culture.
foodstuff was milk:

The Kazakh nomads 1 basic

they milked all their animals, making various milk

products, including cheeses; a staple was kumiss, fermented mare's milk.
Meat and vegetable products, the latter acquired from the non-nomadic
world typically, were important but secondary.^

The men wore trousers,

boots, heavy shirts, made of leather, felt, and skins.

The women wore

long, many-layered skirts and headpieces often described by Western
observers as looking like the headdress of nuns.

They acquired metals,

textiles, and grains from settled peoples, through trading and raiding,
while itinerant craftsmen lived among the herdsmen making artifacts to
nomad tastes.
The differences between civilized folk and nomads in terms of
character and spirituality are many and well-known.

The stress here is

that while the townsman has been separated by his culture from the
natural world, thereby becoming "advanced," the nomad (like other
"primitive" peoples) remains awed by the mysteries of life and calloused
by its hardships.

The spiritual quality of nomadic life is the most

important feature of it, to the nomad, yet it is the least tangible, to
the modern mind.
The intense love of their land and animals permeates Kazakh nomadic
culture, and is most apparent in their oral art.

16

It is difficult to

quantify spirit, a major dilemma for the student of non-Western
nationalism trying to separate primitive faith from modern ideology.
The nature of Kazakh identity particularly reveals this problem, with its
fusion of nomadic culture and historical molding, the latter process to
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be described next.
To overlook the nature of the pastoral nomadic character is
misleading; a similar flaw of "anti-primitivism" is often found in the
study of American Indians, particularly the mounted hunter-nomads of the
Great Plains.

The essence of nomadic life is mobility, kin/communal

mutual aid in a "frontier" milieu, and aggressiveness.

The first creates

a powerful notion of freedom, the second one of egalitarianism, and the
last has captured the historical imagination of the civilized world, as
the following scholarly comments testify.
Nomad life required a more robust physique than that of
the sedentary oasis-dweller. It also demanded a more independent
mind which might, in times of crisis, be called upon to make
swift judgements and take the initiative in a way scarcely
conceivable to the cultivator bound to the ceaseless routine of
the farming calendar. In the struggle for pastures, in inter
tribal warfare and in pursuance of the blood-feud the nomad
naturally developed aggressive instincts which, taken with his
need for the products of sedentary society, often led him to
prey upon his settled neighbors. ... He invariably held in
contempt the settled population of the oases. . . . The
historian who regards pastoral nomadism as an inferior
activity to agriculture is likely to be misled in his reading of
the Central Asian past since he will certainly fail to
appreciate the immense prestige (based primarily upon superior
military prowess) which the nomad has' usually enjoyed among the
oasis-dwellers.^
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CHAPTER TWO
Kazakhstan and the Tsars

The Kazakhs evolved from the Turkic and Mongol nomads of the central
Eurasian steppes who chose the free life of nomadry over the comfort of
civilization.*

Chingiz (Genghis) Khan,

upon conquering Central Asia,

tore asunder the tribal groupings of the steppes and rearranged them for
military purposes.

2

The Chmgizid dynasties which inherited the vast

conquests of the 1200s had disintegrated into "hordes," tribes, and
clans by the 1400s.

(Despite modern parlance, "horde" actually implied

"government.")
The White Horde, a remnant of the Golden Horde, in Central Asia,
had broken up, partly due to the pressure of Muscovite expansion into
the European steppes.

One group of Moslem Turks formed the Uzbek

Khanate, which established hegemony over Central Asia under several
strong leaders.

However, many nomads resented Uzbek domination or

preferred the free Steppe to civilization (or both).

When the Uzbeks

moved south to rule over the oases-states (called Mawaraunnahr), those
tribes and bands preferring the steppe life returned to the northern
grasslands.
These nomads—individuals, families, parts of clans and tribes,
adventurers and indigenous remnants—came to call themselves and to be
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called "Kazakhs."

A Turkic word of disputed etymology, kazak (qazaq)

referred from early times to those who defied imposed authority to live
free on the Steppe—freebooters, raiders, rebels, mercenaries, and those
who defied their hereditary leaders.

3

The Russians adopted the term

for their own unruly frontiersmen, the Kazaks—Anglicized as "Cossacks."
Though the name was originally functional or descriptive, that is,
"the free riders," it quickly and imperceptibly became a national
appellation.

The Kazakhs are often described as traditionally tribal;

in fact, there were Kazakh tribes, some left from indigenous peoples and
some self-formed in the turmoil of the medieval era, but cutting across
the various tribal and subtribal identities was the all-encompassing
4
notion of "Kazakhness," or Qazaqjylyq.

Within the pre-modern, nomadic

milieu, this notion of over-arching unity was institutionalized by
the mechanism of geneology:

non-Kazakhs became Kazakhs by geneological

adoption, often done blatantly, with the goal being to unite all the
Kazakh persons and kin-lines into descendants of the mythical Alash,
literally the "father" of his country."*

Thus, the clans, families, and

tribes of Kazakhstan were constantly modifying elaborate geneologies
linking themselves all to eponymous ancestors, so that by the time the
nineteenth-century ethnographers reached them, the Kazakhs formed a
distinct nation.
The origins of this nation were political, not ethnic.

By the

1500s, the Kazakhs constituted a single people with a single language,
a definite territory, and a common economy.

As they expanded from the

core area of Semirechye into the vast Desht-i-Kipchak, growing in both
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numbers and territory, they developed a typical medieval Eurasian
nomadic khanate state.^
Soviet historians, working within the theoretical framework of
primitive - patriarchal - feudal-capitalist-socialist stages, have long
grappled with the categorization of Kazakh society and economy.

The

elimination of the traditional Kazakh leadership after the Civil War was
justified by their feudal nature, and by extension, the Khanate was
typical "nomad feudalism."^
frustrates this scheme.

The lack of truly "feudal" characteristics

The Kazakhs owned their herds privately, for

instance, while the land (pasture) was owned communally.

Kin and

communal mutual aid customs which provided community support for the
poor and misfortunate were not serf-master or exploiter-producer
g
relations, though portrayed as such in Soviet literature.
Two fine Soviet scholars of the modern era are S. E. Tolybekov, a
9
Kazakh historian, and A. M. Khazanov, expert on pastoral nomadism.
Their delicate compromise describes nomadic culture as "transitional
patriarchal-feudal."

This grants Kazakh culture its traditional basis

while maintaining class-exploitation; it also criticizes nomadic
socioeconomy as basically stagnant or oscillatory.
The great majority in Kazakh nomadic society were neither rich nor
poor, even in pastoral terms of herd-size, the likely result of the
precarious nature of their steppe-life, when drought and dzhuts were
constant levellers.

Life revolved around the community of mobile

camps, the auls, extended only somewhat by greater clan and tribal
relations.^

Authority at this level resided in the aksakal, "white
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beard," and the bii, later formerly a judge.

The Kazakh "masses" were

called kara suiuk, "black bone."
Dwelling amongst them, undistinguished in lifestyle save for the
whiteness of their yurts, were the _ak suiuk, the "white bone."

Their

blood was "noble" in that they were descended from Chingis Khan.

They

only were eligible for election—by the biis—to be khan or "sub-khan"
(sultan).

The biis were chosen by the aksakals to represent the auls.

The wealthy strata, who included both white bone and black bone, were
called bais, "rich."

To be a wealthy nomad was a position more of

responsibility than privilege, for not only did the bai have larger
herds but also he helped support poor relatives and others, such as the
baigush, hired hands.

The goal of the poor nomad was to have his own

herd, which hiring out provided; the dreaded alternative was to have no
animals and be forced to settle down to grow crops.
During the 1500s, as the Kazakh Khanate expanded, three "hordes"
emerged.

Orda referred to the court or retinue of a prince or khan.

The Kazakhs used a different term, zhuz (juz), literally "hundred, a
great many."^

Its use implies an essentially military connotation.

The Hordes represented a practical, even strategic occupation of the
vast steppe.

The Ulu Zhuz (Elder or Great Horde) occupied Semirechye

and the southern deserts, the Orta Zhuz (Middle Horde) migrated from the
Aral area across the central uplands to the northern plains, and the
Kishshi Zhuz (Little Horde) dwelt in the western lowlands.

Each of

these territories represented three natural "orbits" of seasonal
migration within the physiography of Kazakhstan.

The division by zhuz
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merely institutionalized the Kazakh adaptation to environment, and given
the legacy of Chingisid authority, the result was three politicaliftilitary unions within the Kazakh (proto)nation.
Each horde was nominally led by a khan; exceptionally strong military
leaders, notably Kasym (1509-18), Tauke ( 1680-1«? 18), and Kenesary Kasymov
(1840s) united the hordes under one khan, but otherwise each horde's
khan ruled separately.

The Kazakhs were notoriously independent, as

evidenced by their very origins, and individuals, auls, even clans
might leave one horde's orbit for another, to escape oppressive
leaders or find stronger, richer ones, as well as to escape rivalries and
find better pastures.

This essential attitude towards authority caused

Russian bureaucrats much grief.

This seeming instability of Kazakh

society is difficult for the sedentary to grasp, but within the frontier
or wilderness context and given the atomistic nature of seasonal pastoral
migration, it was perfectly reasonable.
Kazakhs a great deal,

Kazakhs rustled and raided other

violence and usurpation of pasture mitigated by

the authority of the aksakals, biis, and khans; they did not, however,
wage war between the hordes.

A Kazakh considered all Kazakhs his kin.

The Khanate flourished in the 1500s and early 1600s.

Its neighbors

were weak or occupied elsewhere; the great shift in the Oriental trade to
European shipping had left Central Asia immensely isolated.

The Kazakhs

conquered some of the major towns of northern Syr Darya, exposing them to
Turkestani influence.

This, as well as the growth of trade with the

settled states, helped create wealthy, powerful Kazakhs with interests
other than the simple prestige-oriented nomad values.
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Calamity crashed upon the Kazakhs in the mid-1600s.

Mongol nomads

of the Oirot nation called Dzhungars (Jungars), to the east of the Great
Horde, had threatened Central Asia before, toppling the Uzbek khanate in
the 1450s in the troubled period of Kazakh origins.

In 1620, the non-

Dzhungar Oirots called Torguts fled Dzhungaria, cutting a bloody swathe
through Kazakhstan to occupy the lower Volga steppe.

From 1650 to 1700,

the Dzhungar armies ravaged Central Asia repeatedly, attacking nomads
and oases alike.

After briefly turning eastward to battle the rising

Manchu power of China, the Dzhungars turned west again in deadly earnest.
The Kazakhs called the troublous times of the Dzhungar wars the
"Great Disaster," aktaban shubirindi.
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wars on the Kazakhs from 1698 to 1757.

The Dzhungars waged seven major
They seized Semirechye, some of

the Syr Darya region, and most of the eastern segment of the central
uplands and northern plains.

In this period, the Russians inaugurated

the so-called Ishim line, fortresses between Siberia and the war-torn
Steppe.

14

In 1723, the Dzhungars devastated the beleaguered Kazakhs

gathered in the old heartland of the Chu-Talas region of Semirechye,
which proved the ebb in the history of the Khanate.
The Dzhungar threat led numerous Kazakh leaders to seek Russian
help.

Although the tsarist empire provided no help, in fact, various

leading Kazakhs swore oaths of allegiance and mutual protection.
was Russia's legal pretext for conquering the Kazakhs.

This

The Manchus

eventually exterminated the Dzhungars, and the Kazakhs reoccupied their
lands and even migrated into vacated Dzhungaria.^

The khan of the

Little Horde took oath in 1731, several Middle Horde leaders followed

17

suit in 1740, and a few leading Great Horde Kazakhs gave nominal obeisance
in 1742.

In fact, the oathing of the khans meant no more to most Kazakhs

than treaty-signing by chiefs meant to American plains nomads, given the
fierce independence and scorn for imposed authority in their character.
Russian authority, like American, ignored this in determination to enforce
law and order, meaning only domesticating the free riders within the
Empire.
The Tsarist conquest of Kazakhstan falls into two phases, the initial
period of gradual penetration and nominal rule, followed by full-fledged
military, economic, and political domination.^

Tsarist expansion to the

Volga and Siberia placed the Kazakhs between Russia and the Orient f s
wealth.

Cossacks were settled along the Ural and Irtysh rivers in the

1600s and 1700s, while fortified lines edged southward across the wooded
steppe, sheltering "illegal" Russian peasants.

Already suffering from

too little pasture, the Kazakhs resisted Russian encroachment.

Russian

concern turned to alarm in the 1770s, when large numbers of western
Kazakhs joined in the Pugachev revolt.^
The Russians attempted a carrot and stick approach, installing
"their" khans in Orenburg, the Steppe frontier capital, paying them
salaries and presumably controlling them, while in the Steppe itself,
brute military force was used against the "wild" Kazakhs who persisted
in raiding and defying authority.

The "kept" khans were worthless, for

the Kazakhs generally ignored them as much as their Russian masters.
However, a new element was introduced with Kazakhs who benefitted from
Russian rule.
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This developing internal conflict as well as resistance to the
Russians reached dramatic proportions by the turn of the nineteenth
century, with Kazakhs fighting each other as well as the Russians.

18

The Little Horde erupted in the 1780s and 1790s with the great rebellion
of Batyr Srym.

After its suppression, the tsar "authorized" a segment

of the Little Horde, under Khan Bukei, to cross the Volga to occupy
pastureland there; the
1801 proved ominous.

creation of the "Inner" of "Bukei Horde" in
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In 1802, Kenesary Kasymov (Kine Sari Kasym-uli) was born to a noble
family of the Great Horde.
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He was attracted to the material advances

of Russian-borne westernization, initially.
years for his people:

Yet his youth saw hard

in 1819 and 1823, some Great Horde leaders took

oath with the Russians; the Tsar "abolished" the Middle Horde Khanate
in 1822, and the Little Horde in 1824.

Russian military pressure and

the tensions of socioeconomic changes only increased through the 1830s.
In 1837, Kenesary launched the last great Kazakh revolt.

Russian

sources themselves describe the revolt as massive, popular, and widely
supported, bitterly anti-Russian,

with its goal independence.

Large

numbers of Kazakhs from all the hordes joined, and Kenesary was elected
Khan of all the Kazakhs (the first since the early 1700s).

In 1841, he

issued a declaration of grievances decrying Russian massacres, injustice,
and land-expropriation.

The revolt was crushed in 1846-47; the Kazakhs

lacked the discipline and modern armaments of the tsarist military as
well as reserves of manpower or wealth to maintain prolonged war.

The

last Khan was killed in 1847, by Kirgiz nobles allied with the state of

1

Kokand, then encroaching on the southern Kazakhs.

The Great Horde

Khanate was abolished in 1848; since the Inner Horde was abolished in
1845, no even nominal independence remained in Kazakhstan.
The second phase of Tsarist rule was military colonial occupation
and administration.
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The Russians captured Tashkent in 1865, gaining

efffective control over all Turkestan.
which studied the region until 1867.

A Steppe Commission was created

The government then divided all of

Central Asia into an array of administrative units.

The emirates of

Bokhara and Khiva retained semi-independent status as tsarist vassals.
The remaining lands of the south were organized as the guberniia or
Governorate-General of Turkestan.
Kazakhstan was divided into six oblasts (provinces):

Akmolinsk and

Semipalatinsk, the northeastern and central regions; Turgay and Uralsk,
the western and northwestern regions, and Syr Darya and Semirechye, the
southern and eastern regions.

All except Syr Darya, in the Turkestan

guberniia, were governed by the Steppe Polozhenie (law code), while the
four northern oblasts (excluding Syr Darya and Semirechye) were under th
control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk,

Semipalatinsk, and Semirechye constituted the guberniia of the Stepnoi
Krai (lfSteppe Region11); Semirechye was transfered to the Turkestan
guberniia in 1897.

The Steppe governor-general resided at Omsk, with

military governors in Semirechye and Uralsk.

The Russians further split

up the Kazakh lands at the uezd (county), volost (district), and aul
levels.
This deliberate gerrymandering had a profound impact on Kazakh
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economy and thus their traditional culture.

Herdsmen who once roamed the

unbounded Steppe now confronted internal barriers across their accustomed
routes.

For nomads who depended on their pastures for survival, this

administrative ripsawing was calamitous.

Some auls of the Middle Horde,

for example, had "nomadized" between the Irtysh, in summer, and the Syr
Darya region in winter, distances of many hundreds of miles, which they
could no longer do, crowding the poorer central and southern pastures
while the Russians took the fertile north.
accompanied with cultural change as well.

Economic hardship was
The Russians countered the

traditional authorities, the aksakals and biis, by abolishing nomadic
elections and appointing the native officials themselves, even paying
salaries.

This led to a serious decline in quality of the Kazakh leaders

and social relations.
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Many of these drastic changes were instituted

with the Steppe Statute of 1868, including the outright expropriation
of all Kazakh land as "crown land."
until 1916 occurred in 1868-70.

Naturally, the last Kazakh revolt

CHAPTER THREE
Russification as Modernization

The T Kirghiz T [Kazakhs] are animals, nothing more. The
Russians are men. The 'Kirghiz 1 are going to China. God be
with them! Let them go! Are they not pagans? We should be
well rid of them! ... If they want to stay with us, let them
remain in one spot, become civilized, and obtain proper
passports; then their land will be secured to them. But if
they must wander about like wild animals, here to-day and the
other side of the mountain tomorrow, then they must pay for
their liberty and wildness.
— Peasant land-surveyor, 19 14, in
Semirechye.^

The Russification of Kazakhstan is best reviewed in four
categories:
education.

2

colonization, industrialization, socioeconomic change, and
The Russians migrated into Kazakhstan as permanent settlers

forcefully displacing the natives from their land, much the way Americans
tamed the Wild West.
wilderness.

They were there to carve civilization from the

The Kazakhs could "choose" annihilation, exile, or

assimilation.

The physical presence of the Russians with their modern

advances was accompanied by cultural influence as well.

With the advent

of modern education, imposed for Russian purposes, a small Russianeducated intellectual elite developed and with

them the powerful

phenomenon of modern nationalism.
Initially, Russian colonization had been limited to the imperial
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frontier with the establishment of Cossack settlements and fortified
lines, with the strategic purpose of encircling and dividing the Kazakhs.
The irony of the Cossack role is their origins as free stepniks like the
Kazakhs.

Indeed, the very name of the Kazakhs was expropriated by the

Russians; "Cossack" and "Kazak" are identical in Cyrillic, so to
distinguish them, the Russians changed the Kazakhs to 'Kirghiz 1 (while
the real Kirghiz, related nomads of the Tien Shan alpine pastures, had
their name changed to Kara-Kirghiz).
The nature of colonization changed radically in the mid-1800s.

3

Russia's land-hungry serfs were set free by the Great Reforms of the
1860s-70s, and the government opened Kazakhstan to peasant immigration
in hopes the vast Steppe could alleviate pressure in Europe.

Peasant

colonization turned from a trickle to a flood in the 1890s, because of
the great famine of 189 1-92 and also due to the construction of the
Trans-Siberian Railroad, which greatly facilitated transportation.

{
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In 1896, the Resettlement Administration, Pereselencheskoe
Upravlenie, was created within the Interior Ministry.

Numerous surveying

expeditions were sent to determine which lands were "surplus" to the
nomads' needs and could be turned over to Russian colonists (through
the Public Land Fund).

Colonization reached a crescendo following the

Stolypin reforms of 1906, which created the first official Virgin Lands
project in Kazakhstan.

The influx decreased sharply with World War I

and the following years of civil war, but by then a massive Russian
population dwelt in Kazakhstan.

About

1.5

million European settlers

had flooded Kazakh lands occupied by only about
a span of roughly two decades

four million Kazakhs, in
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Industrialization was only in its
period;

infancy

during the tsarist

the Trans-Siberian Railroad was the first significant step,

and it came late.^

The mineral treasures of Kazakhstan were largely

unexplored, but several major mining operations were undertaken, with
lead, copper, and silver mining in the Altais in the 1700s, lead and
silver mining in the central uplands in 1834, coal mining in the
Karaganda region by 1855.

By 19 14, some 1,400 industrial workers

labored in the Karaganda area; the workers were overwhelmingly Russian,
with Kazakhs working as laborers and tending to leave with the herds in
winter or when they had accumulated enough to pay the kalym, the brideprice.
Urbanization is one of the strongest factors of industrialization.
By 1911, seventeen towns in Kazakhstan contained 10,000 or more
people.

Omsk was largest, by far, with 127,000 people, located in

the northeastern Virgin Lands.

These cities served primarily as

regional commercial and administrative centers, as manufacturing was
scarcely begun.

The towns along the Trans-Siberian Railroad grew

largest and fastest.
The urban population was also mostly European (Slavic); it
numbered about half a million in 1916 (compared to the total rural
population of about five million).^

Its presence was doubly significant.

It symbolized how far Kazakhstan had come since its origins as simply
the Steppe, home of the free riders.

It also determined the course of

events during the revolutionary era.

In the country, Kazakh nomad faced

Slavic peasant in the ancient duel of horseman versus farmer, but in the
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city, the "pre-modern" Kazakh world-view confronted the truly alien
"modern world."

Because their cultural character was rooted in pastoral

nomadism, which is utterly anti-urban, the socioeconomic effects of
modernization were particularly stressful.
The primary socioeconomic effect of Russian rule and its concomitant
modernization was the extinction of the economic viabilty of Kazakh
g
pastoral nomadism.

The Kazakh livestock-breeding economy had never

been utterly self-sufficient, but it had proven to be the most efficient
human exploitation of the arid grasslands, evidenced by the persistence
of pastoral nomadism through time.

The struggle of nomads for pasture

has influenced Eurasian history, as is well known.

The Dzhungar-Kazakh

wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been a sort of
nomad armageddon which left both sides at the mercy of the empires of
9
the civilized world.

Against the inexorable economic forces of

modernization the Kazakhs could not maintain their traditional economy,
nor the culture which was based upon it.
Sedentarization was not new in Kazakh history.

Given the harsh

nature of the Steppe and its history, the individual fortune of each
herdsman and aul varied considerably over time and space.

The great

nomad chieftain with countless herds one summer could be struck by the
dzhut next winter, or his rivals could carry off his livestock, leaving
him a poor man dependent on his wealthier kin.

By working for them,

he could attain animals for himself, or he could let his kin pasture
what livestock he had left, while he grew millet and harvested wild hay
for them.^

The ex-nomad T s goal was always to regain his herds.
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Sedentarization in terms of modernization was a very different
phenomenon.

The civilized attitude that the only good nomad was one

planted in the ground—as either corpse or farmer—was reflected and
engendered both by government policies and officials, and also by the
structural impacts of industrial economics itself.

Thus, the district

gerrymandering and the Resettlement Administration represent the
former, while the latter aspect manifested itself in the seizure of the
best pasture lands for farming.

In farming areas, pastoral extensive

land use was replaced by intensive farming, deep plowing, and a typical
grain-livestock rural economy.

Even in pastoral areas, the pressures to

supply the Russian market with meat and hides changed the composition
of the Kazakh herds, with horned cattle paramount and the noble horse
secondary.

In fact, Kazakh livestock numbers flourished: from 1906 to

19 16, the total herd size increased by five million head (76%).^
As available pasture declined due to Russian constriction, the
Kazakh economic situation changed.

In the north, close to the Russian

markets and transport, the wealthy Kazakh was Russian-oriented.
remote east, the traditional milieu was least affected.

In the

In the south,

due to the influence of Kokand, the Kazakh elite was incorporated in
the Turkestani world; however, there also developed large numbers of
nomadic Kazakhs who had drifted southward as the Russian pressure in the
north forced them to seek other pasture.

12

Finally, in the west, those

near Russia were much affected but the tribes in the Ust-Urt and Turgai
regions remained much more traditional.
The modern sedentarization not only forced many Kazakhs to take up
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subsistence farming because they could no longer maintain adequate herds;
it ironically increased the power of numerous other Kazakhs.

It was

noted that at least by the early 1800s, a rift was developing between
Kazakhs who benefitted from Russian rule, and those who suffered.

The

economic impact was to make many moderate and poor Kazakhs abandon
nomadism, while wealthy Kazakhs often increased their wealth.

By

the revolutionary era, over 80% of the Kazakh population utilized some
agriculture, while only about a third had done so merely 40 years
13
i•
earller.

Wealthy Kazakhs in Russian areas preserved and extended their
power by allying with the Russians, that is, they remained nomads
because their poorer kin could not.

Wealthy Kazakhs in traditional

areas remained nomads by maintaining their kin as nomads.

This

dichotomy of tangled interests proved a powerful tool of Russian rule.
Pastoral nomads have sophisticated systems of land-use, enforced
by custom (through trial-and-error) much more than by violence.

Kazakhs

had regarded the land (specifically, the pasture) as common to all, with
traditional rights of usufruct for each family within its extended
group f s territory.

In some places, the best sites were reserved for

specific families, in others, it was first-come first-serve; in still
others, usage rotated in a customary fashion between families.

Relations

over pasture and water were vital to the Kazakh culture, which stressed
peaceful resolution over bloodshed.
The pressures of Russification replaced the nomad concept with that
of private property.

The government had seized all Kazakh land as crown
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property with the Steppe Polozhenie.

The best lands were determined to

be surplus to the nomads' needs and were given to the ministry of
Agriculture for distribution to the peasants.

The Kazakhs were left

to compete among themselves for the marginal lands left them.

Those

most amenable to modern changes benefitted, but those most traditional
were more likely to be impoverished.

14

The process began with the semi-private property of each nomad
family, the winter quarters (kstau).
group would lay claim to that land.

Under Russian pressure, the
The Kazakhs had traditionally not

laid up fodder for their herds in the winter, a practice roundly
condemned by civilized observers and seemingly illogical; in fact,
Khazanov points out that the natural grasses recovered quickly when
grazed but much more slowly when cropped.^

As the civilized practice

of fodder-storage spread, Kazakh families would claim hay and meadow
lands also.

Wealthy Kazakhs could use money to buy or rent the lands

of poorer families.

There thus developed rich Kazakh landowners and

jataks, "1 ie-aboutsff without herds, baigush, hired hands, and eginshi,
grain-growers or ex-nomads.
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As never before in Kazakh history, the

nomad society was being stratified into classes.
The fourth major aspect of Tsarist Russification is education.^
"Universal" schooling is a well-recognized component of modernization,
given the industrial society's need for trained workers and skilled
technicians.

Also, colonial administrators need educated natives both

for clerical aid and to stabilize control of the indigenous population.
This education is a two-edged sword, for the native with the training to
work and obey usually recognizes his inferior status and his superior
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opportunity.

He is caught between the modern and the traditional, but

only he—not his colonial rulers nor his fellow people—can bridge the
gap between the two.

The Russian term intelligentsia can be applied

to these intellectually emancipated critics of the existing order.
As early as the 1780s, Empress Catherine II had encouraged Kazan
Tatar mullahs and merchants to proselytize Islam among the Kazakhs; it
was hoped that this would civilize the Kazakhs.

18

Although the Kazakhs

were nominally Moslem, they retained much of their pre-Islamic culture
and beliefs, merely overlaying them with an Islamic veneer.

But through

the nineteenth century, Kazakh Islamicization deepened, partly due to
proselytization of the Tatars in the north and the Turkestanis in the
south, and partly due to the increasing hardship of Kazakh life, which
-. .
.
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increased religiosity.
The Tatars proved troublesome, spreading not only Islam but antiRussian sentiments, while using their intermediary position for their
own profit.

Following the establishment of colonial rule in the mid-

1800s, the Russians ended Tatar influence and inaugurated government
schools.
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Three types developed:

two-year aul schools, taught in

Kazakh, providing a mimimal learning; four-year volost schools that
taught Russian, and advanced six-year schools.

From the latter, Kazakhs

could go on to the Russian gymnasia in Orenburg and Omsk.

The graduates

either entered government service or became teachers themselves.
The Russian-Kazakh secular schools represent direct Russification.
But the impacts of modernization rippled more subtly, also.
education system competed with the Russian, the Islamic.

Another

"Secret"
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Islamic schools spread through the Steppe.

From the south came a very

conservative Islam, providing the traditional Koranic instruction.

But

modernization had created a new Islamic educational movement among the
Crimean and Kazan Tatars.

The "new method" (usul-i-jadid) movement was

a westernized, progressive, yet overtly Islamic educational program
which was very popular in the Russian Moslem world.

It sought to bridge

the gulf between the umma (Islamic society) and the modern world.

Linked

with this modernization of Islam was the Tatar-led movement which
envisioned a great nation of Turkish Moslems.
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Known variously as

Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islam, depending on the emphasis of the reformer, it
sought to gloss over regional, national, and cultural divisions by
focusing on the shared ethnic, linguistic, and religious aspects of
Russia's Turkish-speaking Moslems.
The actual number of graduates of all of these schools was very
small; government-school graduates with a secondary education numbered
only in the hundreds, while only at most 2% of the Kazakh population
was literate by the revolutionary era.
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Nevertheless, their very

existence reveals the extent of the modernization by Russification of
the Kazakhs.
Modern nationalism among the nomadic Kazakhs sprang forth in the
beginning of the twentieth century.

Because of the anomaly, civilized

historians have sought to downplay its significance in the revolutionary
era as well as to deny its existence in the pastoral nomad milieu.
the history of the Kazakhs reveals a fundamental sense of national
identity that transcends "tribalism."

But
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The Kazakhs were a polity before they were an ethnicity.

From the

beginning, they have been characterized by a strong self-conception of
being a nation.
terms.

The pastoral nomadic milieu must be analyzed on its own

Sedentary scholars have strict conceptions of nationalism which

are based on sedentary history, so Kazakh traditional nationalism fails
these modern criteria.

To appreciate Kazakh nomadism on its own ground,

one must recognize this "nomad nationalism."

CHAPTER FOUR
Nomad Nationalism, 1800s-1900

We the children of the Kazakhs,
What would be if we had unity?
^
—Kenesary Kasym-uli, 1840s
Farewell forever,
Cool mountain heights,
Green carpet of grass.
Never would we have left you,
But the enemy is pressing us.
^
—Dosqodzha, mid-1800s

Nationalism is one of the most potent yet protean forces of
modernization.

Central Asia, like so many other non-Western cultures,

underwent a heightened nationalistic evolution due to the westernizing
influences of colonial rule.

It was typical of pre-industrial culture-

areas, composed not of ideological nation-states, but rather of entwined
yet contrasting ethno-cultural groups identifying themselves by language,
lineage, and lifestyle.

Inner Asia was distinctly divided, from ancient

times, between the nomads and the sedentary cultures, a division reflected
in the widespread term "Sart" for the settled peoples whether of Turkish
or Iranian ethnicity, even as "Kazakh" had been applied to the steppe
people.^
The growth of modern nationalism was one of the nineteenth century's
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strongest historical forces.

It influenced the Kazakhs through the

medium of Russia; as Russian culture experienced its impacts, nationalism
thereby developed among many of the non-Russian peoples as well.

The

following summary of the evolution of nationalism in tsarist Russia
is provided by Richard Pipes in his study of nationalism and Communism
in the revolutionary period.^
Minority nationalism awakened due to romantic philosophy in the
1820s, which stirred in non-Russians an interest in their own cultures.
This led to "cultural nationalism" and the first national movements in
the "borderlands."

The spread of Russian Populism, in the 1860s-1870s,

brought non-Russian intellectuals into contact with their own "masses."
By 1900, national parties were forming with liberal and socialist
programs, affiliated with Russian counterparts, except that while the
Russians stressed empire-wide concerns, the minorities were "localist."
Pipes notes the failure of the tsarist regime to heed the clamor for
basic reforms, including the suppression of non-Russian cultures and
minority desires.

He also observes that "The fact that [Russian]

minorities . . . developed a national consciousness before their fellownationals across jhe border . . . was a result of the more rapid
intellectual and economic growth of the Russian Empire."^
Particular developments fostered non-Russian nationalism.

The

growth of Russian nationalism led to "Great Russian chauvinism" which, by
the latter 1800s, had become an official policy
non-Russian peoples.

of Russification of the

This "Official Nationality" deliberately suppressed

minority cultures, obviously encouraging the reaction of anti-Russian
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"minority" nationalism.

The Russo-Japanese War and consequent Russian

Revolution of 1905 encouraged reformers and nationalists throughout the
Empire:

Russia was not invincible.

Lastly, the years after 1905 were

marked by unrest and hard times; the Kazakhs suffered the worst
colonization and expropriation of the tsarist era at this time.
Observers have noted that nationalism developed more swiftly among
the nomads than among the Sarts; the implied surprise derives from the
civilized prejudice which ranks pastoralism inferior to settled society.^
Aside from the basic question of what constitutes nationalism, as the
discussion of "nomad nationalism" above indicated, it should not be
unexpected that the homogenous Kazakhs, who were very mobile and
gregarious, travelling great distances empty of any others but themselves,
were characterized by stronger national ties than the settled peoples,
splintered as they were by intricate, ancient political, social, economic,
ethnic, religious, and historical divisions.
Only 2% of the Kazakh population was educated by the time of the
g
Revolutions.

Among the vast majority of Kazakhs, notions of nation-

states, Pan-Islam, or Pan-Turkism were practically non-existent.

Up to

1917, except for those settled near or among Russians, the Kazakhs were
. .
9
primarily conscious of their tribal and sub-tribal identities.

However,

from the 1770s on, the Kazakhs had been struggling against Russian
expansion and then administrative redistricting, both of which helped
break down tribalism.

The great revolt of Kenesary Kasym-uli, which had

been a powerful "pan-Kazakh," anti-Russian independence struggle, was
evidence of this change.
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Scholars, products of civilization, have argued lengthily about how,
when, and why nationalism developed among the Kazakhs.

Nearly all agree

that it occurred very late and was only a minor factor in the tsarist
era.

This negative view is clearly expressed by Geoffrey Wheeler,

long-time editor of the British Central Asian Review, in his Modern
History of Soviet Central Asia.
Wheeler states that ". . . no coherent desire for separation was
ever expressed by the Muslims of Central Asia."^

He suggests that

what is called nationalism "may not be so much a desire for selfgovernment and civic freedom as simply an age-long addiction to
lawlessness and a chronic dislike of any kind of regular government.11^
By 19 17, "the idea of a nation or even

of a nationality had barely

penetrated among the people of Turkestan."

12

The extent of pre-

revolutionary aspirations "did not include political independence or
self-determination but were confined to such matters as the cessation of
peasant colonization, freedom of religious teaching, freedom to publish
books and newspapers, and the right to elect deputies."

13

Finally,

following the argument of Elie Kedourie, Wheeler states, "In speaking of
nationalism in Central Asia there is a tendency to confuse nationalism
with national consciousness. . . . There is no direct evidence available
of the existence of . . . particularist national consciousness in Central
Asia . . ."

14

But he does admit that "the existence of nationalism in

Central Asia cannot be finally proved or disproved."^
The negative view is widely shared among Western historians.

A

British mining operator in central Kazakhstan in the early 1900s, E.
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Nelson Fell, not a historian but a sympathetic contemporary, perhaps
expresses the negative sentiment:

"Self-government is too hard a nut for

our gentle, milk-drinking [Kazakh] to digest, who have no political
genius and whose ideas of government do not stretch beyond the
patriarchal Aool."^
Tsarist and Soviet opinion has generally agreed with the negative
view, but has been complicated by shifting interpretations; for the
Russians, Kazakh nationalism is burdened by connotations of Russian
imperialism.

The official tsarist version of 19 14, Aziatskaia Rossiia,

acknowledges Kazakh resistance to maintain an independent existence.^
The Russians conquered Kazakhstan for their own imperial purposes.
Soviet historiography has fluctuated with the dictates of
ideology.

18

dominated:

In the early years, Pokrovskii's "absolute evil" theory
tsarist imperialism and capitalism had exploited the nomads

with absolutely no benefits for the Kazakhs, who (save for the rich
feudal leaders) vigorously resisted the Russian conquest.

Growing Soviet

(Great Russian) chauvinism and the patriotic demands of World War II led
to the "lesser evil" interpretation.

While the Empire had exploited the

Kazakhs, at least the Russian people had brought enlightened civilization
to the backwards nomads, who otherwise would have been conquered by
Kokand, China, Turkey, or even the British.
The Russian incorporation of Kazakhstan was an "absolute good" by
1957, as expressed by the Kazakh scholar Tolybekov:
. . . the Kazakh Steppes were not conquered by the
Russian state, since the incorporation of the Lesser and
later of the Middle and Great Hordes was carried out of
their own free will. . . . the union of the Little Horde

36

with the Russian empire did not involve the restriction of
its territory or of its nomadic practices. The isolated
punitive expeditions carried out by Russian frontier troops
in reply to the marauding expeditions of the Kazakh batyrs
(warriors) in the course of which many innocent Kazakh
villages also suffered, cannot be regarded as a general
campaign of conquest against the Kazakhs carried out by
the Russian state.^
The "official" histories of Kazakhstan of 1943 and of 1957 reveal
the Soviet negative view in their variant interpretations of the great
revolt of Kenesary Kasym-uli (1830s-40s).

In the earlier history, the

revolt occupies an entire chapter, entitled "The Struggle of the Kazakh
Hordes to Preserve Their Independence."

It described "the freedom-loving

and fighting spirit of the Kazakh people, who were not easily to be
parted from their national independence."

By the 1957 history, only two

pages on Kenesary are provided, and the revolt is described as:
. . . a reactionary feudal-monarchical movement which
dragged the Kazakh people back to the consolidation of
patriarchal and feudal conditions, to the restoration of
the medieval rule of the Khan, and to the isolation of
Kazakhstan from Russia and the Russian people.^0
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (3rd edition) says merely, "The most
protracted feudal-monarchist movement . . ; was that of Sultan Kenesara
21
Kasymov, who strove to become the absolute feudal ruler of Kazakhstan."
The negative view, as mentioned, prevails among scholars, who are
the product of civilization.

"Nomad nationalism," the positive view,

may be equally too extreme from reality, but at least it seeks to
understand the Kazakhs by their own values, which attributed great
spiritual meaning to their pastoral nomadic culture.

Fell provides some

insight when he states, "the only conclusion which I ever drew from a
study of the [Kazakh] mind, with any confidence in its correctness, was
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that neither our formulae, nor our classifications, nor language could be
applied to it in any intelligent manner."

22

Nomad nationalism, for the Kazakhs, meant the intense association
of their self-identity with pastoral nomadism, as "free riders of the
Steppe."

This identity originated in the 1400s, consolidated in the

1500s and 1600s, and then was assaulted by the aktaban shubirindi and
the Russian conquests of the 1700s and 1800s.

Economically

and

culturally, Kazakh self-identity was threatened.
The Kazakhs are famed as a people of song; lacking written records,
their oral art and literature encapsulated their culture, preserved their
history, and expressed their desires.

Whether he was the jyrau who

served the powerful or merely the akyn who shared the life of the humble,
the Kazakh bard communicated Kazakh thought.

When Kazakh national

identity was transforming in the nineteenth century, the bards reflected
and transmitted the change.
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The earlier poets of the Kazakh "classical" period were anonymous
and worked within well-defined traditions, such as the dzhoqtau (songs of
mourning), qostasu (farewell songs), and heroic epics (e.g., Qoblandybatyr).

The bards of the era of resistance to Russian annexation are

identified along with the leaders they memorialized; from the latter 1700s
to middle 1800s, famous akyns fought beside great war-leaders and with
their fighting poetry encouraged the masses.
Thomas Winner, whose work The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs
(1958) is indispensable for understanding Kazakh cultural development,
describes the significance of the early-middle nineteenth century poets:
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"Their poetry, simple in style and language, was filled with a great
popular energy, a feeling for the justice of the national cause, and an
undying hatred of the Russians and their Kazakh collaborators."
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The role of the intellectual in leading modernization is to be seen
in the pre-literate akyns of the early 1800s, who sought to mobilize the
Kazakhs to the challenges of the new age.

The literate, bourgeois

intellectuals followed their example, when modern education came to the
Steppe.

The influence of the first generation of Kazakh intellectuals is

discernible in the instance of the akyn Makhambet Utemisov (1804-1845),
who played a major role in the revolt of Isatai Taimanov.
Isatai T s counselor and intermediary with the Russians.

Makhambet was

Two themes emerge

in Makhambet's surviving songs which foreshadow the development of modern
Kazakh nationalism.
One theme is that of encirclement by the enemy, really an old theme
for the Kazakhs, apparent in the aktaban shubirindi.

The other is a new

theme in traditional Kazakh society, that of social oppression within
Kazakh culture itself.

The following lines illustrate these concerns.

We cannot now take that which is ours,
We cannot now, in great expanse,
Camp in our own fields—
A high-handed enemy has gripped us all around
In a tight vise.
Oh, men, we all are cursed
Cursed by our unhappy life.
Like free deer we went
To drink from the clear spring; like the wild horse
We grazed on the plains—
And now again we are hemmed in by an enemy.
And from another song:
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What good are golden thrones to the people,
What good are dashing khans to the people,
If there is no justice
For the weak and the p o o r ? ^ 5
The defeat of the resistance in the middle 1800s ushered
of bitter resignation.

in an era

The last major uprisings, those of Iset Kutebar-

uli and Jan Khoja, put down in 1857—58, and of the Adaev Kazakhs following
the implementation of the 1868 Steppe Statute, were suppressed and Russian
control was complete.

Because military resistance was now fruitless, the

Kazakh poet-intellectuals of the mid-1800s could only bemoan the situation
and they withdrew into resentment.
The leading poets of this second generation included Dulat Babataiuli (1802-1871), Abubakir Kerderi (1858-1903), Murat Monke-uli ( 1843—
1906), and Shortambai Kanai-uli (or Qanaev; 1818-1881).^

Murat's

famous "Three Epochs" contrasts the Kazakh golden age with the misery of
Russian rule, concluding with the unanswered question, "How shall we heal
this epoch?"
Shortambai is most famous of these men.

His poem "Zar Zamari'("Time

of Trouble" or "Age of Misery") gave name to this entire period.
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Another famous work, "Opasiz Jalghan" ("Faithless Lying" or "Traitorous
Slander"), cries:
0 unfortunate good people,
0 ill-starred times,
God's anger, it seems, has
Struck you, my native land.
Everywhere the enemy sets nets for us,
There's no freedom, wherever you may look.
Winner describes Shortambai as "the first Kazakh poet able to
analyze the sweep of history and its effect on the people in something
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more than an immediately subjective way . . ."
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Well-educated,

travelled, and strongly Islamic, Shortambai represented the new age as
one of loss of tradition.

The Zar Zamanists emphasized the good of the

old days, free nomadic living, over the travails of the new age, with
the encroachment of the modern world disintegrating the traditional
values.

Only a return to the old ways could save the Kazakhs, and

because it was so obvious that this was impossible, deep resignation
permeates their works; in their call for invigorated Islamic culture,
they revealed the growing power of Islam among the Kazakhs, who were
noted for their lack of Moslem religiosity.
was their reaction to modernization.

Mysticism and despair

The Zar Zamanists could not

answer Murat f s question.
The Zar Zaman poets were strongly traditionalist and nationalist.
They perceived the decline of the Kazakh nation in terms of the decline
of nomadism.

A crucial cleavage thus appears in Kazakh national thought,

based on the support or rejection of pastoral nomadism as fundamental to
Kazakh national character.

Because the very origins of the Kazakh nation

arose from the self-identification as
was a serious cleavage indeed.

n free

riders of the Steppe," this

Amidst the death-throes of nomadism as a

viable lifestyle overthrown by modernization, Kazakh thinkers argued over
the future of their national self-identity.

The Zar Zamanists clung to

the past glories and the ideals of nomad nationalism.
30
A different outlook characterized the so-called Enllghteners.

This

group also flourished in the latter 1800s, thus must be considered to be
of the same "generation" as the Zar Zamanists.

They, however, were the
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product of the modern education system, installed by the Russians and
described above.

As their name implies, the enlighteners were Kazakhs

who sought to uplift and advance—modernize—their people via Russian
language and culture.
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They were fully as dedicated to the Kazakh

nation as the Zar Zamanists, for they wanted to improve Kazakh life.
They opposed Russian exploitation of Kazakhstan for this reason.

But

they recognized that to preserve the Kazakh nation, it must adapt to the
modern world, and thus, they regarded pastoral nomadism as backwards, as
a brake on modernization which had to be removed.

They thus typified

the same dichotomy that developed in Russian culture, between the
traditionalist Slavophiles and the modernizing Westernizers.
Three Kazakhs are reknowned as enlighteners.
Valikhanov (Shoqan Valiqan-uli; 1837?-1865).
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The first was Chokan

The grandson of the last

Khan of the Middle Horde, great-grandson of Khan Ablai, Chokan was a
Russophile, a graduate of the Russian War Academy, and a close friend of
Dostoevsky.

An Orientalist, his admiration for Russian culture was

balanced by his

love of the ancient Turkish epics.

He penetrated as a

Russian spy into the Khotan emirate in Sinkiang; he wrote innumerable
works on the history and culture of his people; he accompanied the Russian
army in its conquest of the Great Horde, in Semirechye.

This last

experience, in which he witnessed outrages against the Kazakhs by the
Russian troops (reminiscent of the American war against the Plains
Indians), soured his faith in Russian superiority, but only at the very
end (he died very young, of exhaustion and tuberculosis, withdrawing to
his people's aul to do so).
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Chokan was typical of the well-born Kazakh educated in the Russian
system.

Indeed, he was famous only to the Russians and to those Kazakhs

who came later.

His significance was in interpreting Kazakh culture to

the Russians, not vice-versa.

Yet, Chokan T s pursuit of modern knowledge

was based on his desire to preserve his people as a nation.

His goals

for the Kazakhs were "Self-development, self-defense, self-government,
and self-just ice;" he dedicated himself "to the useful work of serving
his compatriots and defending them from Russian officials and wealthy
33
Kazakhs."
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The second great enlightener was Ibrai Altynsaryn (184 1-1889).
Modern education was his primary concern, and he is remembered as the
"Kazakh pedagogue."

He was author of the first Kazakh-Russian dictionary

and first Kazakh grammar; he introduced secular prose into Kazakh
literature; he created a new Kazakh script, replacing the Arabic with a
Cyrillic-based alphabet.

He translated numerous Russian literary works

into Kazakh, and was greatly influenced by Pushkin.
Altynsaryn, of the Qypchaq tribe, Middle Horde, attended a Russian
school for interpreters in Orenburg, from 1850 to 1857; he met the noted
Russian educator N. I. Ilminsky in 1859, who greatly influenced him.

He

was appointed school inspector of Turgai oblast in 1879, and did much to
expand the Turgai education system for Kazakh benefit.

In 1887, he tried

to introduce modern education for Kazakh girls; he also sought to create
an agricultural school for Kazakhs.

For his reformist efforts, Altynsaryn

achieved the distrust of his Russian overseers, who feared the power of
his reforms, inasmuch as their goal was subservient Kazakh interpreters
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and not truly educated Kazakhs; he also gained the enmity of the
traditionalists, who opposed Russian contamination, and of the elders,
who opposed secular education generally.
Although Altynsaryn initiated Kazakh prose, the milieu of mass
appeal was poetry.

The following lines come from "Children, Let's

Study."
My child, when you start to learn,
Knowledge, brighter than a lamp,
Will light your way through darkness.
Therefore, children, let us start to learn,
And let us weave forever into our grateful memory
The bright thread of k n o w l e d g e .
The most significant of the enlighteners was Abai Kunanbaev (Abaj
36
or Ibrahim Qunanbay-uli; 1845-1904).

Abai was born in a remote area

of the Kazakh uplands, shortly after his people accepted Russian rule.
Son of a traditional patriarchal chief, Abai first was taught by local
mullahs; he eventually attended an Islamic secondary school (madresse)
in Semipalatinsk, and then a Russian school.
when he was 28,
tribal group.

He broke with his family

choosing to pursue education over administering his

Versed in Kazakh, Islamic, and Western thought, Abai was
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the greatest Kazakh intellectual of the nineteenth century.
describes him:

Winner

"He was at once an educator, a humanist, and philosophical
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internationalist, as well as a poet, prose writer, and translator."
Abai wished to modernize the Kazakhs through the medium of Russian
culture.

His translations of Russian works were well known in the Steppe.

He sought to synthesize Western, Moslem, and Kazakh traditions, and he
popularized prose as a literary medium.

Like Altynsaryn, he wished to
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bring education to all Kazakhs, wealthy or not, male and female.

Even

more so than Altynsaryn, Abai T s enlightenment brought him rejection from
conservative Kazakh leaders as well as the distrust of the Russians, who
regarded him as revolutionary.

Abai withdrew to his people f s aul in the

end, bitter and lonely, yet his efforts proved widespread and longlasting.
The following quotes from Abai best typify

the role of the

enlighteners:
Study Russian culture and literature. This is the key
to life. If you learn it, your life will be easier. . . .
However, at the present time, people giving their children
a Russian education are training them, with the help of the
Russian language, to exist at the expense of other Kazakhs.
Don T t take this v i e w . 39
I want to sow the seed of truth and put wings
to the tongue,
So that the light will enter not only the eyes,
but also the soul.^®
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Kazakh nationalism
seemed to be diverging.

The Zar Zaman poets saw no hope but in the

preservation of pastoral nomadism and the traditional culture based on
it.

They were strongly Islamic and passionately anti-Russian.

Their

goal was maintaining the traditional nomad nationalism that had marked
the Kazakhs from their origins.
The enlighteners, on the other hand, saw no hope in nomadism to
protect the Kazakh nation in the modern world.

They wished to modernize

Kazakhstan via Russian culture, not to Russify the Kazakhs, but to give
them the tools and understanding to prevent Russification.

While their

path was to prove dominant, they lacked the nationalist passion of the
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Zar Zamanists.

Precisely because the Kazakh masses remained traditional

and uneducated, the enlighteners failed to broadly elevate their people
into the modern age.

Yet, because the nomadic economy was crumbling due

to modernization, the Zar Zaman thinkers offered only a sterile pessimism
and no solutions.
The late 1800s and early 1900s, as previously indicated, witnessed a
significant change in the Steppe.

The incredible flood of Russian

peasant colonists in those decades transformed the Kazakh problem.

The

Zar Zaman poets and the enlighteners seemed much less relevant; the
latter based their uneasy alliance with Russia on the premise that the
Kazakhs would have the precious time necessary to gradually modernize,
which meant de-nomadize.

When the deluge of colonization crashed over

the Steppe, Kazakh thinkers of the third "generation" faced crucial
choices to be made in the storm of revolutionary changes.

Their path

proved to be a melding of the fervent nationalism of the Zar Zamanists
with the westernized outlook of the enlighteners.
This melding was visible by the late 1880s.
military f s official Central Asian bulletin
41
Vilayet Gazeti.

In 1870, the Russian

was begun, the Turkistan

Published in Tashkent, up to 1888 it alternated

between Uzbek "Turki" and Kazakh; this was the first appearance of what
42
was to become the Kazakh press.

As with other official papers of the

1880s, such as the Akmolinskii Listok and Orenburgskii Listok, there was
not expression of dissent, but they did bolster Kazakh writing.

In 1888,

a separate Kazakh-language bulletin was begun, Dala Vilayeti, published
dually with the Russian Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta, in Omsk; they were
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supplements of the Akmolmskie Vedomosti, and existed up to 1906.

43

The

Kazakh writers who appeared in Dala Vilayeti wrote cultural, technical,
and historical pieces which would not offend Russian concerns, such as
44
criticism of Islam.
However, as the hardships of the Kazakhs worsened, the Russiancontrolled press was the only outlet for the educated Kazakhs to express
dismay.

Martha B. Olcott, foremost modern American historian of the

Kazakhs, notes that as early as 1890, a series of articles entitled
45
"Hunger in the Steppe" appeared.

The 1890s proved exceptionally harsh
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on the Kazakh nomads, with very severe winters and droughts.

The great

Russian famine of 189 1-92 sent waves of peasants in search of land to
colonize, aided by the Resettlement Administration and the beginning of
the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Time was running out for the traditional

Kazakh lifestyle, time the enlighteners had hoped to use gradually to
settle the nomads while holding Russian cultural assimilation at bay.
At this time, a writer named "Qyr Balasy" or "Child of the Uplands"
47
appeared in the Dala Vilayeti.

These articles, including scholarly

studies of epics as well as poetry, appealed to the Kazakhs to revive
their patriotic nationalism, revealing the influence of the Zar Zamanists.
Yet, partly because they appeared in an official Russian publication,
they also encouraged the elevation of Kazakh culture within the Russian
context.

The fusion of nationalism and enlightenment had begun.

Qyr Balasy was the pen-name of Ali Khan Bukeykhanov (Aliqan
Bokeyqan-uli; 1869-1932), destined to be one of the greatest nationalist
48
Kazakh leaders.

Like most Kazakh intellectuals of the turn of the
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century, Bukeykhanov came of wealthy background:
the grandson of Khan Baraq of the Bukey Horde.

born in Samara, he was

Educated at several

Russian schools, he graduated from the Omsk Higher Institute of Forestry
in 1894.

It was while still a student that he began writing as Qyr

Balasy (he was 2 1 in 1890).
Bukeykhanov was inspired by the Zar Zaman poets in his nationalism,
yet he lacked their Islamic and conservative tendencies; he was produced
by the same Russian educational system as the enlighteners, but he was
far more critical of Russians and Russian culture.

As the Kazakhs

prepared to enter the twentieth century, the first truly "modern"
nationalists were arising from the nomad masses.

CHAPTER FIVE
Qazaq Nationalism, 1900-1916

But what unity is and how to achieve it the Kazakhs do
not know.
—Abay, 1891.
Our newspaper is named Qazaq, our slogan is the
preservation of our national character.
—Ahmed Baytursun, 19 13.

Kazakh nationalism transformed in the early 1900s.

A full-fledged

nationalist intelligentsia emerged, Kazakh written literature gained
great influence, and Western political ideas developed Kazakh form and
content.

The Russian flood of colonization and the decline of traditional

pastoralism placed great strains on the Kazakh masses and their local
leaders, while the hierarchy of sultans crumbled as that of the khans had.
The early twentieth century nationalists, like their predecessors, were
concerned primarily with the cultural preservation of their people.

Their

dilemma was not to create nationalism where it did not exist, rather, it
was to transform the Kazakh nomad nationalism into modern nationalism.
The fundamental cleavage in Kazakh nationalism always remained the
tension between modernization and traditionalism.

This dichotomy appears

in the differences between the elite intellectuals and the illiterate
masses, between the secularists and the clergy, between the Jadids and
48
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the Kadimists (conservative clergy), between Northern and Southern
Kazakhs, and between

f pro- T

and

f anti-Russian T

factions.

Nevertheless,

these cleavages were not enough to prevent the Kazakh nationalists of all
persuasions from working together in the pre-revolutionary era.

The

crisis facing the Kazakh nation in the early 1900s overwhelmed the
differences in outlook.
As early as the 1860s, a Russian observer noted, "The steppe was then
divided into two parties, the pro-Russian and the pro-national. . . .
most convinced supporters of the latter roamed the south ....

The

The

antagonism between these two parties manifested itself in every thing,
3
even in the songs of Kazakh bards."

Northern Kazakhs had a longer

history of relations with the Russians and they were less Islamicized,
more likely to be educated in modern schools.

Southern Kazakhs were

enmeshed in the Turkestani milieu, their nobles and wealthy being under
sway of Kokand and Bokhara, their masses much more Islamic.

Many Kazakhs

in the south, also, had fled Russian expansion over the northern pastures
and thus were both poorer and more resentful.

It is notable, however,

that two cleavages one might expect did not manifest themselves:
Horde and inter-class struggle was absent.

inter-

The former was no longer

relevant, and the latter was developing potency but still minor.
In the context of pre-1905 Russia, Kazakh dissent and agitation for
change was extremely limited.

The writings of Bukeykhanov and other Zar

Zaman heirs in the 1890s and early 1900s urged cultural preservation and
historical pride.

Abubakir Kerderi, for example, recognizing the need

for drastic change, urged the spread of Jadid education so that the
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Kazakhs could
4

Moslem.

effectively compete with the Russians while remaining

Early twentieth century Kazakh writers who followed Abubakir f s

example included Mashur Zhusup Kopeyev (1857-1931) and Nurzhan Naushbayev
( 1859-1919).
Despite censorship and police surveillance, Kazakh dissatisfaction
apparently was spreading in the early 1900s, though Western and Soviet
research on this is sketchy.^

Pamphlets appeared which, addressed to the

"Children of Alash," urged resistance to Russian efforts to limit Islam.
Clandestine meetings in the steppe spread anti-Russian sentiments.

The

regime reacted quickly to these threats, for the first time arresting
Kazakh leaders and searching Kazakh auls to seize seditious materials.
The extent of this activity is unknown; but the Russian authorities did
respond with further restrictions against Moslem clergy and "secret"
schools.
The 1905 revolution changed the rules of national resistance, and the
Kazakhs responded swiftly.

Revolutionary* unrest and violence was

restricted to the Russian industrial workers, in the cities and along the
railways; the size of the proletariat in pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan was
small, a few tens of thousands, and while several thousands of Kazakhs
worked in the mining industry, they provided unskilled labor.^

The real

significance of the 1905 revolution for Central Asians was psychological.
The defeat of the tsarist regime by an Asian power reversed the sense of
hopelessness regarding the immutability of Russian rule.

Just as

important, the reformist agitation that swept the empire forced the
government to permit native publishing, and the creation of the Duma
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meant the opportunity to elect representatives and to openly discuss
politics, for the first time within the modern context.^
Modern Kazakh political development began with the proclamation of
the tsarist Manifesto of February 18, 1905, which permitted political
g
meetings at the various Steppe fairs.

The initial agitation was led by

the Islamic clergy, which sponsored mass rallies in early and middle 1905.
In response to their mostly religious demands, the government allowed
Islamic Kazakh-language teaching in the aul schools, on April 17, and
recommended the creation of a separate Steppe muftiate (official
9
jurisdiction) in June, which followed the next year.
Wholly religious concerns quickly came to include secular problems
as the mood of potentiality spread.

A "bais 1 congress" was held in the

summer in Karkaralinsk, attended by over 14,000 people in response to a
clergy-sponsored petition.^

This meeting petitioned the tsar to grant

more freedom to the Moslems:

to make Islam legally equal to the Orthodox

church, to employ the Shariat (Islamic law) in civil court, to allow
more mosques and the right of pilgrimage.

But it also directly addressed

the fundamental issue of the Kazakh nation, what Olcott calls "the land
problem."

The petition called for the end of land-expropriation and the

return of already-seized lands, with the Kazakhs to control their natural
resources as well.
A similar gathering occurred in October, in Kazalinsk.*^

It also

petitioned the government to ease restrictions on Islam, but even more
forcefully these Kazakhs called for just land distribution and restoration
of nomadic access to the Steppe T s water and pasture resources.

The
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regime did nothing to respond to these requests.
f spirit

When the fervor of the

of 1905* had initially swept Central Asia ? s Russian population,

the government had been relieved at the quiescence of the Moslem urban
natives.

In the country, however, in middle and latter 1905, a wave of

brigandage swelled against the Russians, becoming anti-Russian violence,
that lasted at least to 19 10.

12

Among the southern Kazakhs (Syr Darya

and Semirechye), nomads resisted the seizure of their lands for colonists,
refusing to cooperate with Russian authority.

13

The Moslem clergy was always closer to the Kazakh nomad "masses" than
the secular elite, for Islam was part of the Kazakh traditional culture.
The Kazakh clerics, save for those of the settled south, seem to have
placed their religious goals secondary to the preservation of Kazakh
culture, and therefore they more readily allied with the secular elite
in this era.

As time passed, then, Kazakh demands shifted from the

religious focus to the socioeconomic, yet even as the earliest demands
mentioned the latter, the later nationalist demands always mentioned
Islam.

The alliance of Moslem and secular elites was crucial.

The secular Kazakh intellectuals of the north were also active in
1905.

A delegation of reformists and tribal elders travelled all the way

to St. Petersburg to seek cessation of colonization and the use of Kazakh
as well as Russian in Steppe government; rebuffed, they used the
opportunity to associate with the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets),
which association proved significant in the coming years.

14

The promulgation of the October Manifesto which included the
announcement of a true legislative Duma allowed the Kazakhs to prepare
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their first modern electioneering and democratic politics.

The leading

reformists and nationalists convened two "Congresses of Intellectuals"
in December, that of the East in Vernyy (now Alma Ata) in Semirechye, and
that of the West in Uralsk.^

Both congresses resolved that the Kazakhs

needed to ally with the Kadets for effective Duma representation.
The Congress of the East was presided over by Mokhamedzhan
Tanyshbayev (Tynyshpaev; 1879-1920s?), a Semirechye Kazakh nationalist
who was a road and bridge engineer, and who played a major role in the
revolutionary era.

This congress was dominated by the

Kazakh nationalism, Ahmed Baytursun (1873-1937).

16

1

ideologist 1 of

Baytursun was born in

Sartubek, Turgay oblast, into an aristocratic family of the Argyn tribe.
First taught by local Tatar mullahs, he went to the Russian-Kazakh school
in Turgay (town), then attended the Orenburg Pedagogical Institute from
189 1 to 1895.

Thereupon he became a teacher in Kazakh schools from 1895

to 1909, teaching in various villages and the towns of Aktyubinsk,
Kustanay, and Karkaralinsk.

A poet and linguist, Baytursun developed a

Kazakh script based on Arabic, rather than utilizing Altynsaryn f s
Cyrillic-based alphabet.

By 1905, he was generally regarded as one of

the secular elite's leading thinkers.
Ali Khan Bukeykhanov was president of the Congress of Intellectuals
of the West.

Attending were important intellectuals, elders, and

aristocrats of five oblasts; absent were the westernmost Kazakhs of the
old Inner or Bukey Horde, who generally kept apart from the other northern
Kazakh elites.^

It was at this meeting that the group later called

"Alash Orda" was formed.

18
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The Congress of the West, besides approving the alliance with the
Russian Kadets, also proclaimed the following:
In the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Steppe no one other than the
Kirghiz has any rights; the laws which declare that the
Kirghiz Steppe belongs to the Crown, and that peasants and
cossacks can be settled on it at no cost need to be r e v o k e d . ^
From 1905 on, the secular elites dominated the nationalist struggle,
particularly Baytursun and Bukeykhanov.
both the pan-Islamic

1 al1-Russian f

This dominance is evident in

Moslem congresses of 1905-06 and the

Dumas, as well as in the Kazakh press and publishing of 1905 to 1916.
While the Islamic clergy remained important at the local level, the
secular reformists led the movement Steppe-wide, and their alliance
remained mutually beneficial.
In Moslem Russia generally, the 1905 revolutionary era allowed the
pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic reformists, predominantly Tatar, to organize
20
several "All-Russian Moslem Congresses."

The First Moslem Congress was

held secretly in Nizhnii Novgorod in August, 1905; the Second, also
unsanctioned, occurred in St. Petersburg in January, 1906.

Neither the

Kazakh nor Central Asian Moslems participated in the first two congresses.
The Third Moslem Congress, this time legally convened, occurred in
August, 1906, again at Nizhnii Novgorod.

A mass meeting was held in

Kazalinsk in January, representing much of the Steppe, in order to draw
21
up a list of demands for the congress.
concerns were expressed, as previously.

Both socioeconomic and Islamic
The Kazakhs continued to practice

modern politics; despite their great geographical and ideological
diversity, the Kazakh elites were developing the arts of compromise and
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concerted action which they needed to face the overwhelming Russian and
strong Tatar forces blocking their nationalist goals.
The Kazakh presence at the Third Moslem Congress was significant.

22

Shah Mardan Koshchegulov was elected to the presidium; Koshchegulov was a
mullah, of the Bukey Horde, Astrakhan province.

The relative lack of

relevance of the Moslem Congresses, dominated by Tatars with their goals
of pan-Turlcism and pan-Islam, emphasizing the "middle dialect" reformism
of the Tatar leader Gaspirinsky, is indicated by Koshchegulov T s presence.
The Kazakh nationalists emphasized Kazakh language over any other, and
the long antipathy of the Kazakhs to their Tatar mentors meant that the
Kazakhs offered no support to pan-Turkism.

Koshchegulov, though a

nationalist, was not part of the northern Kazakh intellectual circles
that became the Alash Orda.

While the Tatars sought to unify all the

Turkic Moslems of Russia, the Kazakhs sought to modernize their own
unique nationalism.

Likewise, they were not interested in pan-Islam

due to the secondary importance Islam had in the structure of Kazakh
nat ionalism.
The most significant 'laboratory 1 of modern Kazakh nationalism was
23
the State Duma.

Although the Kazakhs participated fully only in the

Second Duma, the experience of holding meetings to elect representatives
and sending these delegates to St. Petersburg elevated political
awareness across the Steppe.

Communication is an elemental force of

modern nationalism; the Duma, especially the journalistic reporting of
its deliberations and the new press's discussions and editorials, proved
the catalyst of modern Kazakh nationalism.
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The elections to the First Duma occurred in spring, 1906.

Though

Turkestan was prevented from participating, and the limited franchise
excluded many Kazakhs, the electioneering in the Steppe was exuberant.
Richard Pierce describes it best:

"Speaking in the open air, often from

horseback, candidates in the Steppe discussed land reform and urged the
abolition of the Steppe [guberniia] and the establishment of self24
government."

Russians and Kazakhs voted separately; the Russians sent

leftist representatives (Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries,
Trudoviks), five altogether.
The Kazakhs sent four delegates to the First Duma, which was held
from April to July, 1906.

Ali Khan Bukeikhanov represented Semipalatinsk

oblast, the northeastmost Steppe (though he was of the Bukey Horde, and
had presided over the Congress of the West, revealing his broad support).
The mullah Bahit Kirei Kulmanov represented Akmolinsk; the bii Alpyspay
Kalmenev, Uralsk; and Akhmed Beremzhanov, a justice of the peace, Turgay.
The Kazakhs cooperated with both the Moslem fraction 1 (largely represented
by the Ittifaq-al-Muslimin, or "Muslim Union," created at the Second and
Third Moslem Congresses) and with the Kadets.

However, the First Duma

ignored the concerns of the Kazakhs.
Due to transportation difficulties, Bukeykhanov did not reach St.
Petersburg until July 9, 1906.

On that very day, the Duma had been

dissolved by Tsar Nicholas for being too liberal.

Bukeykhanov went with

the other delegates who travelled to Viborg to sign the protest manifesto.
For this act, he was arrested, tried, disenfranchised, and sent to a
Semipalatinsk jail for three months.
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The Second Duma convened from February to June, 1907.

The Steppe

sent eight Russians and four Kazakhs; the Turkestan guberniia was able to
participate in this election, sending a fifth Kazakh.

Shah Mardan

Koshchegulov represented Akmolinsk, Beremzhanov again represented Turgay,
Khadzhi Narokonev, Semipalatinsk, and the lawyer Bakhitjan Karataev,
Uralsk.

Tanyshbayev represented Semirechye oblast.

Karataev, an examining magistrate and member of the government land
26

commission, was able to address the Second Duma upon the Kazakh plight.
He cailed for a commission, including Kazakhs, to investigate the land
problem; the Octobrists, Kadets, and Moslem fraction supported him, but
the Council of Ministers refused.

The Kazakhs then petitioned Stolypin

directly, to curtail further Russian colonization and to study the land
problem, but were rejected again.
In 1907, the "Stolypin reaction" brought to a halt the budding
political process.
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The Kazakhs, with most other Moslems, were denied

further Duma representation.

Many Jadid schools were closed, some leaders

arrested, and the incipient Kazakh press was stillborn.

However, the

Kazakh leaders continued to organize and to lobby the remnant Moslem
fraction and the Kadets.

Thus, in late 1907, they organized meetings

in various towns of the Steppe, including Troitsk and Kustanay, to gather
material for a Moslem fraction report presented to the Third Duma.
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The

Kazakhs demanded the end of peasant colonization, freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, and Duma representation.

The Kazakhs proposed

reform of the granting of land to the Third Duma, also, and though sixty
29
delegates supported the legislation, it failed.
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During the Third Duma, the Kadets prepared a volume of reports on
the nationalities of Russia.

Bukeykhanov prepared the essay on the

Kazakhs in 19 10, which clearly details the Kazakh plight and harshly
30
criticizes the governments policies and practices.

Bukeykhanov noted

that Russian oppression had created such economic hardship that the
Kazakh people had been forced to overcome their old divisions and unite,
creating an intellectual transition from passive to active national
consciousness.

He recognized that nationalism usually arose to safeguard

territorial integrity, but that the Kazakhs, being pastoral nomads, were
concerned with preserving their way of life, not geography.

With the

decline of the economic viability of nomadism, Kazakh nationalism had to
be based on the traditional culture of the Kazakh heritage, not on
pastoral nomadism itself.
The goal of Russian policy, Bukeykhanov argued, was not merely the
sedentarization of the Kazakh people, but the destruction of their unique
Kazakh culture.

Therefore, Russian rule was actually antagonistic to the

Kazakh nation, even having seized Kazakh ownership of the land to give to
the tsar.

The Kazakhs must launch a political struggle to preserve their

culture, and to remain a unique people they must unite despite many
differences.
. . . in the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Steppe a policy of Russification
has from time immemorial been conducted by those who shine neither
in educational qualifications nor in knowledge of the local
population. The customary attendant of this Russifying policy is
coarseness, rudeness, and the unceremonious slighting of us by
those who constitute the sacred population.^*
Bukeykhanov T s essay provides an introduction to the role of the
Kazakh press and publishing in the development of Kazakh nationalism in
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this period.

The Kazakh press was the mode whereby the Kazakh leaders

communicated, with each other and with the masses, their frustrations,
perceptions, and goals.

In articulating these factors, the Kazakh

intellectuals continued to thrash between modernization and traditionalism.
The revolutionary-era Kazakh press was the single most influential element
in the swift maturation of Kazakh nationalism between 1900 and 1920.
The Kazakh press went through four 'waves' in that time.
occurred in 1905-07, and was reformist (Jadidist).

The first

The second came in

1911, following the Stolypin reaction, and was therefore radicalized.
The third arose in 1913; the last, in 1917-20, will be discussed later.
The initial Kazakh press proved ephemeral, partly due to the paucity
of printing technology and the newness of the concept of journalism, but
mostly due to the police repression which closed down on it.

The first

Kazakh newspaper was Qazaq gazeti, published in Troitsk in March, 1907,
and immediately suspended.

Bukeykhanov appeared regularly in the Russian

opposition press Irtysh (1905-06), Omich, and Golos Stepi (both 1907), all
in Omsk.

Kazakh writers also appeared in 1906 in Tatar papers such as

Fiker (Uralsk), Vaqt, and Shura; in 1907, in Sirke (St. Petersburg).
The Stolypin reaction drove underground much activism.

The Kazakhs

continued to hold clandestine meetings, where Kazakh writings were read
and discussed, while numerous 'youth groups' were organized, especially
33
in the northern towns where there were many Kazakh students.

The

activities of these groups were significant in developing Kazakh
nationalism, but their secrecy hinders evaluation to this day.
The nationalist press had justified itself to the regime by reporting
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on the Dumas; when the Central Asians were denied Duma representation,
34
their journalist press was forbidden as well.

However, Kazakh literary-

publishing was developing as well, and managed to continue the reformist
and nationalist development throughout this period.

Winner f s Oral Art

and Literature of the Kazakhs amply details much of the writing of this
time; the following discussion is intended only to indicate the diversity
and depth of Kazakh publishing between 1905 and 1916.
Perhaps the greatest Kazakh poet of the revolutionary nationalist
era was Mir Jaqib Dulatov (Duwlat-uli; 1885-1937).
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Born in Turgay

uezd, he was educated by Tatar mullahs, in aul schools, and at the
Turgay Russian-Kazakh school.

He was a qualified teacher at both the

Gaurgan Russian-Kazakh school and the Galiyeh madresse in Ufa.

He was

close friends with Tatar reformers, was a prolific poet, and wrote one
of the first Kazakh novels, Bahtsyz Jamal (1910), criticizing traditional
marriage customs.

A close confederate of Baytursun and Bukeykhanov,

Dulatov is usually included with them as the three great leaders of
Kazakh nationalism.

Vilified in Soviet historiography, yet he was

described in the Literaturnaya Entsiklopediya (Moscow, 1928) as "the
leader of the revolutionary Kazakh masses" in 1905.
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In 1909, Dulatov published a collection of poems entitled Oyan
Qazaq! (Awake, 0 Kazakh!).

The work was so popular it quickly went

through two editions, before the Russians banned it as inflammatory.
The poem "Kazakh Lands" is worth quoting at length.
Noble, influential men, pay attention to this! They say
"Strike while the iron is hot;" by not following this
proverb,
You take responsibility on yourselves for the tears of
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future generations.
Oh, dear native land, you have gone entirely to the
[Russian] settlers!
The sacred graves of our forefathers are now amidst
village streets.
The tombstones over them will be used by the peasants
for bathhouses,
The wooden fences [around them] will go for firewood.
Then, finding no signs of our old graves, we shall
pour out streams of tears.
The huge lakes and flowing springs, like the summer
pastures and forests, are all alienated.
When I think about all this I go out of my mind and
burn (as in a fire) from grief.
But we accepted citizenship without giving up our land,
We hoped to live under the shelter of justice.
If now we give up the last land, the cattle will have
to be pastured on sand.
The simple people are stunned. . . .
Kazakhs, now where is the land on which you have lived
since the Kazakh tribe was formed?
They drove you off and put the land under Little
Russian settlements. . . .
Only the salt lakes and the waterless plain, useless for
•
Q7
agriculture, are left to us. J/
Shangerei Bukeev (1847-1920) was a poet from western Kazakhstan,
born into an aristocratic family and educated at a secondary school in
Astrakhan.

Of Russian gentry rank and a justice of the peace, Bukeev

concentrated on lyrical love poetry and literary artistry.
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Sabit

Donentaev (1894-1933), born in rural Semipalatinsk, was a satirist and
journalist.

He was first published in 1913; his satires strongly
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attacked the old aristocracy and the nationalists.
Omer Karasy (Qarashev; 1876-1921) came of a poor nomad family in
the Bukey Horde; he went to a Tatar madresse and to secondary school in
Istanbul.

He became an ishan (cleric), and was widely versed in Islamic

literature.

However, the 1905 revolution caused him to become a social

agitator and he was dropped from the clergy.

His poetry was steeped in
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Kazakh tradition, yet he criticized not just the Russian oppressors, but
also the Kazakh aristocracy.

His social and nationalist protest was

modern in content, but often traditional in form.^
Ispandiar Kobeyev (1878-1956) published the first Kazakh novel,
Qalym, in 1908.

It not only criticized the tradition of the bride-price,

one of the strongest Kazakh customs, and the general inferiority of
41
women in society, it actually advocated marriage for love.
Beimbet Mailin (1894-1939) was born in Kustanay to poor nomads; he
studied at an Ufa madresse from 19 13 to 1915, when he published his first
work, concerning the tragic love of a Kazakh girl.

Mailin eventually

became a Communist (1925) and was considered a "founder" of Kazakh Soviet
42
1 iterature.
Sultanmakhmut Toraygyrov (Toraighir-uli; 1893-1920), born in
Semipalatinsk oblast, was one of the first Kazakh writers to emphasize
social protest in revolutionary terms.

Though he only received a

madiesse education, by 19 13 he was working in the Kazakh press; he was
also a teacher.

Toraygyrov 1 s social protest was striking; the metaphors

and imagery of traditional Kazakh poetry he replaced with unflinching
43
directness, as the following lines, from "The Pauper," reveal.
Autumn's hand has endowed the grass with a silvery hue;
Over the nocturnal earth clouds are floating.
Dark is the night. I am guarding the sheep with my dog;
Not even a little fire lights up the darkness.
My clothes are in rags, I am almost not clad,
And these are the only clothes I've ever had.
From the day of birth, only hunger I've known;
Crying I would ask my mother for food . . .
From earliest childhood I had but one dream:
Once only to fill my stomach with good food.
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All my life, like an ox, I have worked day and night,
And yet this dream has remained but a dream.^
Despite Toraygyrov's emphasis as a social protester, regarding the
Kazakh aristocracy as no better than the Russians, he still fulfilled
the role of Kazakh educated elite as enlightener, evidenced by the
following lines:
I do not live in order to sow flowers,
And see them bloom into live beauty;
I live to help my descendants with my song,
So that their paths may be easy and simple.^
Magzhan Zhumabayev (1894-1937?), born in remote northwestern
Semirechye, was reknowned as a leading nationalist poet.

He studied

first at a Tatar madresse then the Omsk gymnasium, and eventually at
the Institute of Artistic Literature in Moscow.

His poems first
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appeared in 19 13, and he was a leading contributor to the Kazakh press.
Saken Seifullin (1894-1939) came to be regarded as the first Kazakh
"proletarian writer."

Born into a moderate nomad family, in Akmolinsk,

he was taught first by the aul mullah, then he attended a nearby Russian
factory school for three years, before going to school in Akmolinsk (town).
He went to the Omsk Teachers' Seminary from 19 13 to 1916.

Here he was

exposed to Russian socialism and even Bolshevism; he was active in the
Omsk student group Birlik.
Akmolinsk uezd.

In 19 16, Seifullin became an aul teacher in

As will be seen, Seifullin's significance actually

concerns his role as the first Kazakh Soviet writer and opponent of Alash
Orda; but his early biography provides another example of the development
47
of the Kazakh intellectuals of the period 1900-1916.
The years 1908 to 1911, despite the suppression of the Kazakh press,
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were by no means quiet.

Rather, Kazakh nationalism intensified, as the

Russian peasantry swarmed over the best lands at the peak of colonization,
while the government not only facilitated their invasion, it arbitrarily
denied the Kazakhs the newly-found freedom to criticize it.
Just as in the days of Abay, when activists gathered at his aul for
discussions, the intellectuals and youths continued to meet in camps and
48
in towns.

.
Baytursun himself was imprisoned m 1909-19 10 for anti-
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Russian agitation among clandestine revolutionary groups.

As he had

been a teacher until this, one can surmise that the Kazakh tradition of
enlightenment was now utilized to spread nationalism among the students
and through them their traditionalist nomad families scattered across the
Steppe.
Thus, M. S. Kashatov wrote in 1908, "Let us study sciences,
religion and trade, and lead our people out into the world.The
result is revealed by the Kazakh Communist G. Togzhanov, writing in 1927:
In the prerevolutionary period the only political
education we received was from the nationalists. We saw
and knew only Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, Ahmed Baytursunov,
and Mir Yakub Dulatov. They were the example for us. From
them there was one road, nationalism, and by this nationalism
we came to the revolution. Nationalism did not come from the
head of Ahmed and Ali Khan. Nationalism was the general
desire of the Kazakhs. Nationalism was directed against
tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie.^^
By this time, the upsurge in education that had begun in the 1890s
52
had led to many more educated youths.

By 1905, there were over 2,000

Russian schools in Kazakhstan, almost 130 Russian-Kazakh schools, and
53
135 Islamic mekteps (primary schools).

Literacy was increasing,

though the actual numbers of literate Kazakhs was small (perhaps only
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100,000 by 1920, in a population of about 4 million).

A measure of the

increase is that while only 75 books were published in the 1800s,
mostly in the latter decades, over 200 were published from 1900 to

The absolute numbers of educated Kazakhs and published materials
seem comparatively small, but their influence was much more widespread
than available Russian statistics might indicate.

The governor-general

of Turkestan, Samsonov, stated in 1910:
A great many publications are being issued in the native
languages continuously, [and] . . . are sold at extremely low
prices, being distributed quickly without leaving a trace (as
a consequence of which a majority of such publications remain)
completely unknown not only to Russian scholarly institutions
b u t also t o t h e local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . ^
And Bukeykhanov, writing in 1924, recalled that:
Before the revolution, not a tiny spot in the plains was
unacquainted with Kazan's publication of Kazakh books. . . .
The Kazakhs who had studied in the Tatar schools of Kazan, Ufa,
Orenburg, Troitsk, and Petropavlovsk were themselves the
suppliers of Kazakh books. . . . Judging by the fact that one
meets the old Kazan publications throughout the plains even
today, it must be concluded that the merchants organized the
distribution of their publications e f f i c i e n t l y . ^
The third and most significant surge of the Kazakh periodical press
rose up in 19 11-12.

Despite police repression, Kazakhs started up

several journals and newspapers, some of which were as short-lived as
previously, but others were significant through the civil war era.
nationalist group Alash Orda coalesced in 1912.^

The

Writing in 1920,

Manab Shamil noted:
. . . the spreading of revolutionary ideas, that is, rather, the
ideas of national equality and liberation, was observed especially
among the student young people from 1912 on. Those who inspired
the awakening of the young Kazakh intelligentsia
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were 'revolutionary' Kadets prominent at that time, the
journalists Bukeykhanov, Dulatov, and B a y t u r s u n . ^8
Among the briefer journals appeared Qazaqstan, four issues published
in Urda (Khanskaya Stavka) in 1911, and fourteen issues in Ural'sk in
19 13.

Its circulation was a few hundred, its program pan-Islamic and

anti-Russian, and it was published by Shangerei (Shahin Girey) Bukeev.
Among its contributors was Omer Karasy.
censors.
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It did not survive the tsarist

Another paper was Ishim dalasy, published in Petropavlovsk

by the Russian daily Ishimskii kray in latter 19 13; one of the very few
socialist-inclined papers in the Steppe, it was quickly suspended; its
focus was the land problem.^
The journal Ay gap began in January, 1911, published m Troitsk.

f\

i1

It was a modernist literary and cultural review, its editors being poets
and writers, teachers, and historians.

Its chief editor was Mukhammedzhan

Seralin (1872-1929), a poet and intellectual activist who had been a
teacher from 189 1 to 1902.
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Contributors included Bukeykhanov and

Baytursun, Koshchegulov, Bukeev, Naushbayev, Toraygyrov, Donentaev,
Zhumabayev, and Seifullin.

Ay gap emphasized the revival of Kazakh

culture and language, revealing the unbroken line from the enlighteners
to the reformists to the nationalists.

Eighty-eight issues (monthly,

then bimonthly) appeared before it was suspended by the government in
1916, with 900 to 1,200 copies per issue.
With such a diversity of contributors and its focus on cultural
preservation, Ay gap presented the entire spectrum of Kazakh nationalism.
It was both bourgeois liberal and pro-Islamic; its contributors were
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nearly all from the aristocratic or clerical elite.

It supported the

pan-Turkist movement of Gaspirinsky, it criticized the outmoded
patriarchal customs and especially the position of women in society,
and it supported the spread of Islamic education.

Indeed, Ay gap argued

for the use of the Shariat or Islamic law, and it regarded the Moslem
clergy as the needed ally of the secular elite.
The editors of Ay gap viewed pastoral nomadism as a brake on the
modernization of the Kazakhs; sedentarization was a necessity in order
to create a nation able to resist the physical and cultural invasion of
the Russians.

But settlement needed to take place at a pace that would

not destabilize Kazakh society, or it would be as destructive as Russian
colonization.

The tsarist regime's policy of sedentarization was for

Russian, not Kazakh purposes.

When Ay gap sought a pan-Kazakh congress

for the winter of 1913/14, to work out the best method of settlement,
the Steppe governor-general refused to allow it, arguing that Russian
63
policy was not within their purview.

Russian denial of the nationalists'

involvement in shaping a sedentarization plan remained a constant of
Kazakh history throughout this period.
The editors of Ay gap believed that the material decline of Kazakh
life was due to the economic decline of nomadism.

They felt that, while

pastoral nomadism had been the foundation of the unigue Kazakh culture,
it was no longer relevant to a modern Kazakhstan.

The inevitable first

step as a modern nation reguired sedentarization, as Omar Karasy implied:
Eternal nomadic livestock breeding was not ordered as
the eternal Kazakh fate. There comes a time when we are
able to live as agriculturists and as traders. The present-
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day Russians and Tatars and other settled peoples first led
nomadic lives, raising livestock. How they are occupied in
the present day is known by all. We are no worse off than
they are and we are the children of humanity. We are also
able to live as they d o .
On February 2, 19 13, the bi-weekly periodical Qazaq appeared.^

This

was the vehicle of the leading nationalists who formed the group called
Alash Orda, "Horde of Alash."

Published at Orenburg by Mustafa Urazayev,

with chief editor Baytursun, its staff and contributors constituted the
core of the secular intellectual activists of the prerevolutionary and
revolutionary periods: Bukeykhanov, Dulatov, Zhumabayev, Tanyshbayev,
Halel Dosmukhammedov, and others.

Within a year, its circulation rose

from 3,000 to 8,000 copies per issue.^

Qazaq ceased in 19 18.

Like Ay gap, Qazaq emphasized the preservation of Kazakh culture.
Folklore, literature, and above all, the Kazakh language occupied its
pages.

Unlike Ay gap, however, Qazag was much more overtly political in

nature, and it disdained Islam.

It was suspended by the Russian censors

over two dozen times in its first two years alone.
For the writers of Qazag, the preservation of their language was as
crucial as the land problem.

The lead editorial of the very first issue,

written by Baytursun, explains this position and deserves guotation at
length:
For centuries the Kirgiz [Kazakh] people occupied its
own territory and lived its own life; but now a flood of
colonists is inundating our steppes. What is our future to
be? History teaches us that when a foreign element shows
itself to be culturally stronger than the native population,
it inevitably absorbs the latter. By contrast, if the two
elements balance each other culturally, they can develop
side by side enjoying their own rights and preserving their
national characteristics. The ultimate transformation of
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the economic life of the Kirgiz seems to be inevitable.
Peasants are settling on our arable land, our lands are
being requisitioned . . ., in short foreigners are penetrating
into our midst. The problem of the very existence of the
Kirgiz people is facing us in a most acute form. In order to
preserve our autonomy we should struggle with all our strength
in order to acquire education and culture. We must in the
first place develop our national literature. We should never
forget that only a people who has been able to create its own
literature in its national language has the right to an
independent existence .
In general, Qazaq advocated expanded Kazakh-language education,
emancipation of women, and equality of rights for Kazakhs with Russians.
It perforce tread carefully regarding the regime, but forcefully argued
against Russian economic and social policies harmful to the Kazakhs.

Its

contributors criticized the traditional leadership for failing to
preserve, much less advance, Kazakh culture, they chastised those
intellectuals who placed Russian knowledge before their own, and they
regarded Islam as a hindrance to modernization.
Whereas Ay gap wanted Shariat law, the editors of Qazaq were against
increasing Islamic power, given Tatar domination of the Islamic reform
movements.

They upheld adat, customary law, as Bukeykhanov explained:

The Kazakhs are non-Muslims, at very most half-Muslims.
The preservation of cutoms and traditions is useful to the
Kazakhs. The Shariat is harmful to the Kazakhs.^
The Qazaq writers regarded pastoral nomadism as no longer viable,
and that clinging to it was dragging the nation to ruin, because the
Russians grew stronger while the Kazakhs weakened.

The fear of alien

blood swamping their nation, and the rational realization that economic
advancement was vital for its survival, impelled the intellectual
nationalists to advocate sedentarization, which was the antithesis of
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Kazakh self-identity as free riders of the Steppe.

The nationalists

could accept settlement, but only if the Russian colonization ceased,
in order to provide the time and space the Kazakh masses needed to become
modern.

In this regard, Qazaq was much more bitter towards the regime

and its policies than Ay gap, and more specific in its analysis:
. . . the transition of the local population to a sedentary way
of life means the voluntary giving over of land to the settlers
from the central guberniias of Russia. In order to maintain
in their hands sufficient land masses the local residents ought
to receive land parcels according to the so-called 'nomadic
norm' and so land parcels in that norm would be twice as great
as according to the sedentary norm . . .
The opinion of the newspaper Qazag on the agricultural
guestion is to support the position of seizing the Kazakh land
according to order and law. The expropriation of land
according to order means not to destroy the existing economic
order of the Kazakhs: that is, if the Kazakhs live by
agriculture, then give them land according to livestock breeding
norms and take the remaining surplus. To take away land means
to have some sort of legal position, published so that the
resettlement officials do not get out of hand. When the
resettlement officials take away Kazakh land, they are unable
to depart from this legal position. 69
As indicated by the guote from Baytursun at the opening of this
chapter, the founders of Qazag deliberately chose to name their
journal "Kazakh 11 and not "Kirghiz. 11

The utter lack of regard for the

Kazakhs by their Russian conguerors was proven every time a Russian called
a Kazakh by the other name.

The Kazakhs themselves always used "Kazakh"

(or "Qazag" in the contemporary orthography).^
was a fundamental revolutionary statement.

To use the title Qazag

Unlike the enlighteners of

the past, the Qazag nationalists did not wish to emulate the Russian
culture, they only wanted to acguire the modern technological skills of
the Russians so they could better oppose them.
was antithetical to Kazakh existence.

Tsarist imperial rule

The secular intellectuals were
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realists, and knew that overt demands would only rouse overt Russian
resistance.

Nevertheless, their ultimate goal was the creation of a

wholly Kazakh nation—Qazaqjylyq.7 1
Ay gap and Qazaq were allies, not rivals; the overlapping lists of
contributors prove that.

The former focused on cultural preservation,

the latter on economic and political.

They represented the main stream

of Kazakh intellectual development, and dominated the politics of the
Steppe.

However, two much weaker intellectual currents opposed them,

the southern Kazakhs of Syr Darya and a scattering of socialist-leaning
Kazakhs found in the larger, Russian-dominated towns.
In late 1913, a group of southern Kazakhs formed "Ush Zhuz," or
"The Three Hordes."

They began a periodical, Ush Zhuz, at first published
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in Tashkent.

The Kazakhs of Syr Darya were distinctly more anti-Russian

than the northern Kazakhs, and much more Islamic in outlook.

Some were

aristocratic and pro-Bukharan, given their long relations with the emirs
of Turkestan; others were poor or even destitute, driven out of the Steppe
and Semirechye by the Russian exploiters and expropriators.

They were a

combination of very conservative Islamic clergy, reformist intellectuals
who looked to pan-Islam or even Istanbul for rescue from Russian rule,
and angry young nomads or ex-nomads hating Russia.

The leader of the

Ush Zhuz was Kolbay Togusov, himself left-leaning and also personally
antagonistic to the leadership of the Qazag group.
After 1914, Ush Zhuz found supporters in Semirechye, Turgay, and
in the Russian towns of the north, particularly Omsk.
resistance to the Russians.

It advocated armed

As time passed, it grew more radical, which
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drained its support among the southern Kazakh clergy but increased it
among the poor north and south.
The second strand of opposition to the Qazaq intellectuals was that
of the few socialist Kazakhs found in the towns, and especially among the
students exposed to Russian radical thought.

Though very few in number,

given the lack of a Kazakh proletariat, the leftists have ever since been
lionized by Soviet historiography as the true leaders of the Kazakh
masses, while the Qazaq writers are scorned as "bourgeois-nationalists 11
and the conservatives as "feudal reactionaries."

7^

Ironically, the Kazakh

leftists had the least prerevolutionary significance, but the longest
history of Kazakh intellectuals:

in 1849, the tsarist government had

exiled to Vernyi, Turgay, and Semipalatinsk members of the radical group
called the Petrashevtzy; in the Steppe, these radicals met and influenced
Kazakh intellectuals of the incipient national movement
From 1900 to 1916, Kazakh nationalism developed rapidly and deeply.
But modern nationalism existed only among the intellectuals, who were
very few in number, widely scattered, and divided by upbringing and
outlook.

The nomad (rather, by now, semi-nomad) Kazakh masses were not

antagonistic to the intellectuals, though often their elders were; the
intellectuals 1 tradition of enlightenment spurred their efforts to
communicate with the general population, and despite difficulties of
terrain, class status, and limited technology, the intellectual elites
were not separated from their people in comparison to the gulf between
the Russian intelligentsia and the peasantry.

Kazakh traditional society

consisted, at least ideally and to some extent in reality, of harmony

73

between aristocrats and commoners, white bones and black, bais and
baigushes.

The overwhelming threat of Russian annihilation of their

culture was a powerful bond of unity among a people whose national identity
had always been strong.
The Kazakh masses lacked comprehension of the Westernized political
system of thought that modern nationalism implies.

Up to 19 16, even the

Kazakh intellectuals apparently sought only cultural autonomy and the
political rights to preserve that autonomy.

The absence of any overt

demands for political/territorial independence by the nationalists is
justification for the view of modern experts that the Kazakhs did not
experience 'real 1 nationalism.
However, when one considers the day-to-day context of prerevolutionary
Kazakhstan, it becomes apparent that such demands for independence would
have only set back the intellectuals' struggle even more.

The political

and cultural repression of the Kazakhs was based on the overwhelming
material superiority the Russians possessed.

Also, the Kazakhs lacked

accessible models of nation-states, surrounded as they were by empires
like the Russian, Chinese, and Ottoman.

The intellectual nationalists

were desperately seeking time to coax the Kazakh masses into the modern
world; calls for full independence would have been suicidal.
The prerevolutionary Kazakh nationalists acknowledged that the
Kazakh people had ceded their sovereignty to the conquering Russians.^
They therefore worked with the basic assumption that they were part of
a huge multinational empire with a favored overclass, the Russians.

In

that framework, the intellectuals demanded a great deal of independence,
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from land expropriation, cultural assault, and population inundation.
To seek to lever the Kazakh millions into the twentieth century while
advancing their culture, to try to sedentarize a people whose very identity
was the antithesis of settlement, was an awesome task in itself; they
needed to modernize first, and regain their independence from a position
of strength later.
In early 1916, had one asked a leading Kazakh intellectual, he would
have been dismayed at the thought of attempting full independence from
Russia.

The intellectuals needed to modernize; Russia was the avenue of

that modernization.

Looking about him at the typical Kazakh herdsman,

peaceful, friendly, even meek, lacking all but rudimentary hand weapons,
the intellectual would have predicted the obvious:

if the Kazakh people

took up arms against the Russian Empire, they would be slaughtered.
goal of Qazaqjylyq would be delayed greatly, if not forever.

The

To seek full

national independence, in the context of his world in 1916, would only
result in a terrible, avoidable tragedy.
The events of 1916 were very tragic.

CHAPTER SIX
Steppe Aflame:

Revolt of 1916

The times have become evil,
Under the heaviness of the tsar's hand.
What can we expect from the authorities,
Since for them we are but beasts of burden?
Hearts have become inflamed in anger against them,
The dzhigits (warriors) are eagerly awaiting the
ris ing.
They will not submit to the decree,
But are going into battle.
.
—Qulbash, 1916.
Rumors are flying across the steppe,
Rumors about human misery.
Aytkhodzha dies under the whip,
And Uzakh under the bayonet.
Above the blue waves of the Issyk-Kul,
A hot battle took place,
And from the deadly bullet of the tsar,
Many a dzhigit laid down his life.
And in the bloody Karakul
Over their captive victims
The authorities have avenged themselves
Behind the steel of prison doors:
Submissively here soldiers were shooting
In prisons, among stone walls,
And our delegates were falling,
Washing the courtyards with their blood.
By night the prison had almost emptied;
They rolled the bodies into ditches and
Ending this bloody business,
The enemy raced towards our auls.
^
—Anonymous, 1916.
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World War I transformed the modern age.

Its relationship to the fall

of the tsarist empire and the rise of the Soviet Union is axiomatic for
historians.

The great 'native' uprisings in Central Asia in 19 16 have

been oddly overlooked, however, despite their significance as a massive
mid-war diversion of Russian military resources, as part of the rise of
'third-world 1 nationalism, and as a crucial precursor of the BolshevikWhite struggle in this arena.

This bitter vosstanie or popular revolt

rocked Russian Central Asia from July through the end of 19 16, involving,
though very separately, the civilized peoples of Turkestan and the
Turkomans of the desert, the Kirghiz of the mountains, and the Kazakhs of
3
the steppe.

When finally suppressed, the revolt had cost the Central

Asians dearly in destroyed and plundered property, as well as in lives.
Hundreds of thousands were killed, out of a total population of eight
million, while about four thousand Russians were lost, with over 90%
being settlers and the rest officials, out of nearly two million
4

residents.

The Kazakhs fully participated in the turmoil of 1916.

The secular

nationalists, however, withheld public support in their publications and
meetings, while doing everything they could do mitigate the uprising.
The traditional local leaders, the elders, as well as the anti-Russian
Islamic clergy were everywhere in support of the rebels, who were gangs of
youths hiding in the steppe.

The Russian suppression of the uprising

devastated the innocent herdsmen as much as or more than the marauding
youths.

The social and economic havoc that resulted weakened Kazakh

national resources, but left the secular intellectuals as the only real
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focus of opposition to the Russians in the revolutionary era to follow.
The spark of the uprising was an imperial ukase of June 25, 19 16,
which decreed that

a half-million

Central Asians, aged 19-43, were to

be mobilized for labor brigades in the war effort.

The immediate cause,

then, was the hardships of World War I on Russia's Central Asian colonies.
However, the underlying reason for the desperate, doomed uprising of the
Kazakhs in 19 16 was due to Russian colonization and the usurpation of
their land.

Therefore, a summary of the impact of that expropriation is

appropriate.
By the census of 1897, about 600,000 Russians dwelt in Kazakhstan.^
In the next twenty years, over 1.5 million emigrated to Kazakh lands, so
that by 19 16, four million Kazakhs shared the six oblasts with nearly two
million Russians.

The ratio of Kazakhs to Russians fell from 5.5:1 in

1897, to 2:1 in 1916.

The heaviest influx occurred in the five uezds of

the northern plains called the Virgin Lands, where the Russian population
jumped from 230,000 to 900,000.

Semirechye was heavily inundated as well,

with a quarter-million Russian colonists, and over 11 million acres
seized.^
Kazakhs.^

By 1915, the Russians had taken 67 million acres from the
The invasion peaked just before World War I (when immigration

was suspended):

while the Russian population increased by 400,000 from

1897 to 1905, it grew by 900,000 between 1905 and 1916.
The Kazakhs were not only crowded off the best pasture-lands by this
invasion, they were increasingly impoverished as nomads.

In the early

1700s, an 'average 1 Kazakh household of the Middle Horde possessed about
100 sheep, 30-50 horses, 20-25 goats, 15-25 cattle, and several camels
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g
(while a wealthy nomad might own ten to twenty times as many.)

By 19 15,

the average nomad household owned a total of 26 animals, while only one
in twenty families owned more than 50 animals in 19 17; yet the size of
9
the Kazakh herds increased from 17 to 30 million from 1885 to 1917.
Obviously, some Kazakhs did benefit from Russian rule, perhaps one-tenth
to one-fourth; in 1910, Bukeykhanov estimated that 61% of Kazakhs were
poor, and 22% were rich.^
Nomadism declined greatly.

At least one in five Kazakhs received

some sort of wages in 19 14; over 18,000 Kazakhs worked in the coal and
copper industries by 19 16.^

By 1911, the majority of Kazakh families

did some farming, with 70% combining agriculture and herding by 19 17.

12

Only one in four Kazakhs was wholly nomadic, while 18% of the Kazakhs of
the Steppe and Semirechye lacked sufficient livestock and 40% had no sown
13
land whatsoever.
The amount of land farmed by Kazakhs increased from
1.2 million to 1.65 million acres between 1906 and

1916; by 1917, 50-75%

of farmers in Kazakh areas were Kazakhs, but they tilled only 20% of all
14
^
sown ilands.

World War I exacted further hardships on the Kazakhs.

Central Asians

had always been exempted from Russian military service, and during the
war the government expected whole-hearted economic support to
this exemption.^

The Kazakhs already paid the so-called

other special taxes and

? pay f

f kibitka T

for
tax;

Requisitions' were added on, greatly burdening

the nomads, who paid a flat per-household rate that harmed the poor,
obviously, more than the rich.

16

Besides the special war-taxes and

contributions required of all Central Asians, the nomads also had to pay
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an added kibitka tax, a local tax, and a war-tax.

The government forced

them to give supplies to troops through their areas, to transport goods,
perform other war-related labor (ditches, etc.), and to contribute huge
numbers of livestocks and yurts.

Despite the huge price-spiral in food

and price-fixing by Russian merchants, Kazakh animals were seized for a
fraction of their value, or for nothing at all.

Corrupt and partisan

officials, Russian and Kazakh, often profited greatly, by pocketing what
funds the government did pay, and by skimming the nomads' tax payments and
contributions.

In the Steppe and Semirechye, where many peasants had gone

to war, the nomads were forced to work their farms for them.^
As the war lurched disastrously in 19 15-16, the Russian government
considered the mobilization of Central Asians and other exempted inorodtsy
(non-Russians) for military or at least labor service.

18

Huge losses in

manpower in late 1915 initiated the debate, and by mid-1916 the situation
seemed critical:

the army needed a half-million replacements per month,

and there was only a three-month reserve.

The regime decided to mobilize

the Central Asians for rear-line labor (supply transport, wood-chopping,
guarding horses, digging ditches) throughout the empire, freeing Russian
soldiers for the front.
Tsar Nicholas signed the mobilization decree June 25, 1916.

The

decree called for 243,000 natives of the Steppe oblasts (250,000 from
Turkestan).

The Steppe natives were nearly all Kazakhs, so using

statistics for the Steppe oblasts only, the following calculations show
that the government requisitioned the vast majority of eligible Kazakhs.
Half of all Steppe Kazakhs were male; of these, 70% were aged 10 to 59
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(that is, 20% were 10-20, 50% were 20-59).

Assuming that half of these

were aged 19 to 43, some 300-350,000 Kazakhs were eligible to be drafted.
Thus, while about 8% of the total male population of Turkestan was to
be mobilized, some 25% of the Steppe was to be.

20

The date for the call-up was set for July 15.
hastily drawn up and poorly thought out.

The decree was

Kuropatkin, the Russian general

who suppressed the revolt, wrote that the Prime Minister and the Minister
of War "did all that was possible to stir up the population," and that
the decree was written "in such a hurried and indefinite form that it
21
caused utter confusion in the minds of the population."

The Russian

officials in Central Asia gave scant attention to educating the natives
as to the purpose and nature of the mobilization.

They briefly considered

that the Central Asians might misconstrue the military-style call-up (by
age-brackets), but dismissed the concern.
and Semipalatinsk

The decree reached Tashkent

on June 28, Akmolinsk on June 29.

Governor-General

Erofeev of Turkestan held a meeting July 2 to work out the mechanics; it
was decided to establish regional quotas to be met by conscription based
on lists drawn up by local officials and village elders.

Governor-General

Sukhomlinov of the Steppe announced his order for June 30, 1916, and tried
to explain the decree:
The requisition order does not call these persons as
soldiers into the army but for work necessary for the army
in return for pay and provisions from the T r e a s u r y . ^2
Despite the vastness of the steppe, word of the conscription order
spread swiftly.

A Semirechye Kazakh intellectual, Turar Ryskulov ( 1894 —

1937), hurried home from Tashkent to spread the word.

Kazakhs working
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on Russian farms immediately returned to their homes.
the steppe, and the Kazakh auls were widely scattered.

It was summer in
Rumors and the

lack of government explanation fanned worry into panic and anger.
Kazakhs began to flee immediately, fearing the worst.

Some

It was rumored

that the government was taking the Kazakh youths away to dig trenches
under enemy fire.

In Semipalatinsk, the story spread that the conscripts

would be forcibly Christianized.

Semirechye nomads believed it was a

ruse whereby the Russians would seize the rest of their lands.

Many in

Turgay thought the order came not from the tsar, but was a plot of the
bais and volost (district) elders to benefit at the expense of the poor.
Everywhere, the Kazakh youths fled into the wilderness in bands.

Adding

to the confusion, the Kazakh interpreters had difficulty translating the
decree into Kazakh terms.

23

The government's response to the first troubles was to send Cossack
detachments through the Steppe.

An official report from early August

indicates the result:
The appearance in the steppe of the Cossack units brought
terror to the peaceful population of the great area. The Kazakhs
up to this time peacefully awaiting the call of the subject
workers, became agitated: in places leaving all of their property,
selling the land for a song, they went away to the south. The
youths left the auls, went into the steppe, and it's unknown
where they are. Everywhere the Kazakhs left the ripening grain;
the cut hay remains in heaps, rots, and is carried away by the
wind. The economy is dealt an irreparable blow seeing that from
the time of the announcement of the call no one has been
occupying himself with agricultural matters. In the Urzhavsk
volost of the Lepsinsk uezd of the Semirechye oblast the Kazakhs,
goiqgno one knows where, poisoned their grain and hay for the
cattle.24
The first outbreaks of violence occurred in early July, in Samarkand
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among the Sarts, and among the Kazakhs, in all the Steppe oblasts.
mid-July, the

By

disturbances were severe in Turkestan and widespread in

the Kazakh areas.

Semirechye nomads began fleeing east and south into

Chinese Sinkiang.

Finally, on July 30th, the tsar postponed the call-up

to September 15, which had the desired effect of cooling the uprisings.
But by latter September, violence flared anew; however, the government
had by this time gathered the military force to suppress the revolt,
which consisted now of stomping out local fires.

25

Popular reaction in the revolt of 19 16 was split between flight and
resistance.

Bands of youths up to 1,000 strong roamed the countryside,

armed with crude implements, where they assaulted the officials to seize
their conscription lists.

Sometimes the native officials were killed as

well; when Russian troops were sent to protect the officials, the Kazakhs
fought them.

The decree became the tool of numerous corrupt officials to

extort and harass their rivals, and many of the wealthy simply bought
their way out of conscription (the decree exempted mullahs, some bais,
and local officials, but rather than mollify popular resentment by not
taking the local leaders, this further inflamed the anger of the poor).
The greatest amount of violence was not between Kazakhs, however, it was
directed against the Russians, especially the settlers.

26

The following regional summary of the revolt among the Kazakhs is
intended to show its variability of intensity as well as its widespread
character.

27

In western Kazakhstan, unrest began in Temirtau and Guryev areas.
On July 8, a volost starshina (headman) was killed in Uralsk uezd; soon,
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the entire oblast was in disorder.

Volost officials were beaten and

their lists seized by gangs of youths.
sporadic, however,

The unrest was scattered and

The Russians had long been established in Uralsk,

especially the Cossacks, and punitive detachments had quelled the
uprising by November.
Neighboring Turgay, on the other hand, witnessed the fiercest
resistance of the Steppe oblasts, from Kustanay and Aktyubinsk in
the north and west to Irgiz and Turgay in the south and east.

Turgay

oblast had received many poor nomads driven from the northern plains and
the southern deserts by the Russian settlers, and its tribal groups
remained some of the least

1

tamed 1 of all Kazakhs.

Under Khan Abdul

Gafar Dzhambusynov, the warrior Amangeldy Imanov (1873-1919), and the
revolutionary Alibai Dzhangildin (1884-1953), the Kipchaks allied with
the Argyn and Naiman tribes to form the best-organized rebel force in
the steppe.

On October 23, they attacked the town of Turgay with some

15,000 men, and beseiged it for three weeks.

They assaulted the town on

November 5, but failed to take it due to dissension and lack of arms.
The Russian relief expedition under Lieutenant-General Lavrentiev raised
the seige on November 16, scattering the rebels with heavy casualties.
By the end of November, only 6,000 Kazakh warriors remained; Amangeldy
held out in the Batlakkara desert until the following February when the
Provisional government passed a general amnesty.

28

The resistance in Akmolinsk began in mid-July and was widespread.
A group of central steppe elders met in Atbasar uezd on July 16.

Violence

had occurred in Petropavlovsk a week before, in Akmolinsk July 11.

The
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most serious fighting was in the Bayan-aul region; Akmolinsk officials
sent the following message to Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg) on
August 1:
The Kazakhs are acting in a very provocatory manner,
ride about only in large parties and threaten the population
of the Russian settlements that they will kill and burn in
all directions, especially the very new settlements. The
Russians cannot defend themselves as the men of the Russian
settlements have been taken away for the war. The Kazakhs
attacked the Russians working in the fields, and took away
all their draught animals, machines, carts and harnesses.
. . . In place of the usual 25-40 kibitkas the Kazakhs began
to group themselves into 300-400 kibitkas. The Kazakhs
gathered into a group of 15 thousand around Lake Kurgalajin.^9
By September, Omsk authorities reported nearly 30,000 Kazakhs
near Akmolinsk.

The town itself, with a population over 60,000, was
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attacked September 26-7, October 3-4, and October 6.

The Lavrentiev

forces began pacification of Akmolinsk oblast then, and the disorders
were over by late November.
region indicates the method:

The Cossack sweep of the Kenderlinsk
over forty armed Kazakhs were killed here

on October 25, then the Russians killed twenty more nearby, and stormed
through the area attacking auls, seizing herds and food, burning winter
camps, and killing.
The first violence in Semipalatinsk was in mid-July along the Chinese
border.

At their height, the Kazakh bands numbered several thousands,

with several such bands in all four uezds.

31

In the central steppe,

a large number of Kazakhs gathered in Karkaralinsk.
listen to those urging submission.

They refused to

The Governor himself came to calm

the area, after the murder of several officials; an angry Kazakh mob
. 3 2
slew two native officials right in front of him.

The uprising was
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put down in Semipalatinsk region by region, though Zaisan was not
pacified until early January, 19 17.
Syr Darya was least disturbed by the revolt, which began here in
33
mid-August and had ended by late September.
Russian reprisals.

Many Kazakhs fled, fearing

Syr Darya had the least number of Russian settlers,

primarily because most of its arable land was already farmed by the
Turkestanis.
The revolt in Semirechye was most violent of all.
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The nomads here,

both Kazakh and Kirghiz, had suffered the most recent and devastating
colonization.

General Folbaum, aware that the uprising was imminent, took

measures in July to suppress it, including the placement of troops
throughout the oblast, and also made efforts through intermediaries to
persuade the nomads to stay calm.

The revolt came later to Semirchye,

perhaps due to this, but it was the fiercest.

On July 10, delegates of

eleven districts met at ancient Otrar to plan the resistance; thousands
of youths were ordered to hide in the wilderness along Lake Balkhash.
The Tashkent-Vernyi road was assaulted, and by August 10, the oblast was
in general revolt.
The Russian settlements, strung along post-roads and river-valleys,
were attacked by Kazakh and Kirghiz marauders, some of whom had seized a
shipment of Russian arms.

Thousands of Kirghiz beseiged Tokmak in mid-

August, dying with amazing bravery against Russian machine-guns.

In the

mountains, settlers were attacked mercilessly, so that entire regions
were depopulated of Russians, the farms in ruins.

The arrival of the

Lavrentiev expeditionary force in mid-September turned the tide; soldiers
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and settler militias had pacified Semirechye by the end of the year.

One

of the great tragedies of the revolt was the 300,000 nomads who fled into
Sinkiang during the revolt.

Unwanted by the Chinese and attacked by the

locals, afraid to return to Russian vengeance, these refugees perished in
great numbers; eventually, about 30,000 returned.
A more typical tragedy is found in the story of the Kazakhs of
35
Belovodsk, in Semirechye, m mid-August.
murdered.

Here, two Russians were found

The settlers formed a militia which rampaged through the Kazakh

auls indiscriminately.

After several days, the local police chief

persuaded more than 500 Kazakhs to come to Belovodsk to discuss the awful
situation.

Upon arrival 3 the Kazakhs were arrested and locked up, and

then the Russian colonists were allowed to slaughter them.
When Kuropatkin toured Semirechye in September, he passed through
Belovodsk and recorded this:
At the entrance to the settlement . . . the widows of the
murdered men stood on both sides of the road in [Kazakh] mourning
clothes, and as if at a command they raised a cry, asking me to
return their men. . . .Follbaum, the military governor of
Semirechye . . . believes that this cruel punishment served a
purpose, as it stopped the wavering [Kazakhs] of other volosts
from joining the rebellion, for which they made preparations.
I strongly warned the population that anyone who now takes it
into his head to plunder, whether Russian or [Kazakh], will be
given over to court-martial and the gallows.^
Estimations of Kazakh losses m the revolt are difficult to make.
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The Russians compiled statistics on their own losses in Turkestan and
Turgay, but not for the rest of the Steppe, and not at all on native
losses.

If one includes deaths through the consequent famine in much of

the area, the casualties were staggering.

The Russians lost about 4,000
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people, over 3,000 of whom were in Semirechye alone, and about 9,000
farms.

In Turgay, 45 Russian civilians and 3 officers died.

Central Asian losses numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

Later

Soviet calculations estimated that Semirechye alone lost 300,000; the
number of nomad households there fell by two-thirds (62,000 to 20,000);
losses here amounted to 20% of the people, 50% of the horses, 40% of the
cattle, 60% of the sheep and goats, and about 400,000 acres of cropland.
The heavy-handed peace imposed by Kuropatkin in Semirechye, which forced
thousands of nomads to resettle in barren mountain regions, took its
toll.

The population of Turkestan fell by one million from 19 14 to 19 18.

The Kazakh revolt of 19 16 was spontaneous and sporadic.

The leaders

were mostly local elders and headstrong youths; the majority of Kazakhs
did not participate in the revolt, seeking only to protect their families
and herds.

No upper class Kazakhs were associated with the revolt except

in Turgay and Semirechye, where it was the fiercest.

The 19 16 uprising

was the desperate act of impoverished nomads and angry youths, while the
settled Kazakhs of north and south, and the established, wealthy bais,
mostly kept apart from the revolt.

The Kazakh secular nationalists also

did not openly support the uprising.
When the Russian government, including the Duma, first began to
consider mobilization, the nationalists carried on heated discussion of
the issue, particularly in the pages of Qazaq.

In the January 24, 19 15

38
issue, for example, three writers made the same points.

Ahmed Jantaliev

wrote:
. . . in case Kazakhs are taken to military service, then
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it is necessary that they be given the same advantages which
those people who have always served in the army already have.
Kazakhs must also be given the rights which Cossacks enjoy
and they should serve in the cavalry. Furthermore, Kazakhs
should be allotted lands equally with the Cossacks.
Mustaki Maldybayev noted that, "as a result of the absence of birth
certificates and other documents among the Kazakhs, it is very difficult
to determine their ages and clarify who is liable for call."

And Salmak

bey Kesmetov argued:
It is impossible to assume that Kazakhs will forever be
free from military service. But if the question of military
service is to be decided, then it would follow that this decision
come with the participation of the Kazakhs themselves. If
Kazakhs must be called, will they serve in the infantry or the
cavalry? ... We think that it would be very opportune to
raise simultaneously with the question of military service,
the question of Kazakhs 1 participation in the Duma and the
distribution of their lands.
Other Kazakh writers discussed the issue in various other papers
as well.

All linked military or labor service with restored Duma rights

and the land problem.

The Kazakh nomads discussed the issue among

themselves as well, as a Semirechye nomad described a meeting in the
39
fall of 1915.
From January, 1916, right up to the decree itself, the writers in
Qazaq argued that mobilization should be as cavalry troops, with rights
equal to the Cossacks, and Duma representation restored.

Tanyshbayev,

later testifying about the revolt of 1916, said this:
In December 1915 this project was discussed in the press.
On Jan. 24, 1916 the paper "Kazak" (no. 166) gave the opinions
of some influential Kirghiz (Kazakhs) as to the question of the
expected placing of military service on the Kirghiz; the question
of the desire or lack of desire to serve in the army was not
discussed at all; all interested themselves in the question of
how the Kirghiz would serve—in the infantry or in the cavalry,
the question being thrashed out on the pages of the "Kazak"
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Nos. 166, 168, 177, 179, 184—the last of June 9 . . . In
general the articles of the said numbers may be summarized
1) the majority of the Kirghiz prefer service in the
thus:
cavalry (including myself), the minority stood for service
in the infantry. 2) It is proposed that in view of the
absence of birth certificates among the Kirghiz the call for
military service in the near future will be beset with many
difficult ies
Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, and N. Begymbetov travelled to Petrograd
,
4
in early February, 1916, to discuss mobilization with tsarist officials.
Among the Russians they met was the Minister of War, General Polivanov;
apparently satisfied, the Kazakh leaders returned to the steppe and
continued to argue for rights in return for service.

They had gone to

the capital in order to bring "to the attention of the Government and
the Duma the general opinion of the Kazakh nation," that "in the event
of an inelcutable call—to be placed in the cavalry and not the infantry
with an equalization of the Kazakhs with the Russian Cossacks in land
42
ut ilization."
When the mobilization decree came, the Kazakh leaders must have
been bitterly disappointed.

Their goal of modernizing the Kazakh nomads

required time and exposure to modern institutions; appropriate military
service would have provided both in good measure.

But they realized that

the Kazakhs were in no bargaining position, and therefore sought to
ameliorate the distress which the order caused among their people.
stressed cooperation with the order and urged calm:
tsar should be carried out without question.
43
must be our duty."

"The order of the

To serve the tsar, that

"Restrain yourselves, submit to law.

ill-intentioned provocators.

Qazaq

Away with

Guard the people of Allah from a calamity

44
inspired by an evil spirit."
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Tanyshbayev, an Alash Orda leader in Semirechye, and the guberniia
interpreter I. Dzainokov travelled the oblast, seeking to calm the nomads
and convince them to cooperate with the decree.

They distributed issues

of Qazaq, which argued that the tsar's order must be obeyed, and perhaps
. .
45
the Kazakhs would be rewarded with military status thereafter.

Later,

Tanyshbayev described his experience:
I, myself, though personally understanding the essence of
the whole matter of conscription found myself in a difficult
position: at the gatherings of Kirghiz [Kazakhs] I explained
that the term military work included work on the construction
and operation of the railway, lading, the carrying of
provisions, the guarding of horses, the chopping of trees for
fuel, etc., but was told sharply that in the telegrams and
newspapers nothing was said about this but only about
emplacement work and that I do not speak accurately at all
and that they had been told this by peasants they knew in the
settlements, among whom there were relatives at the front . .
In late July, two delegations of Kazakh intellectuals passed
through Astrakhan, going to Petrograd to petition for recission of the
order.

The first was led by Kalmenev, Uralsk representative at the

First Duma; the second was led by a former official, G. Nukashev.

Though

unsuccessful, their journeys reveal the growing sophistication of the
nationalists, willing to travel the vast distance to the capital to deal
47
with the Russian regime directly.
On August 7, 19 16, the Kazakh secular nationalists convened a
48
meeting of Kazakhs from across the Steppe and Semirechye.

The

conference was held in Turgay with the participation of the oblast
governor, who announced the decree and asked for their help.

After he

left the hall, the conferees elected Bukeykhanov president of the
assembly, with Dulatov and 0. Almasov as secretaries.

The informal
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protocol of the meeting reveals the position of the moderate nationalists
49
of Alash Orda during the crisis of 1916.

The assembly recommended that

the mobilization proceed, but only after modifying it and delaying it.
It should be postponed to January 1; the first to be called should come
from the youngest age-group, who had the fewest families; workers should
be kept close to home, one worker should be left per family, and workers
should be able to substitute others.

Mullahs and teachers should be

reserved for each aul, and the medressa teachers should be exempted.
The old lists must be discarded, and new lists drawn up by committees of
one representative per 10 households.

Each volost was to have two

delegates, and workers in towns should participate in city and zemsky
voting.

The workers should form artels, each with a translator and

every ten with a mullah; transportation and passes must be provided for
the conscripted workers.
These Kazakh demands were ignored by the government, and the mass
of Kazakhs ignored the intellectual elites generally during 1916.

The

secular nationalists, most of whom came from upper and middle class
backgrounds, supported the regime out of practical necessity.

However,

given the situation Qazaq faced, skirting the Russian censors amidst the
turmoil of World War I (it was suspended 26 times in 19 13-14 alone), the
nationalists could hardly have advocated any other course and remain with
any voice or influence at all.~^

Apparently, in private, even the Alash

Orda moderates supported the rebels, or at least their goal of defending
the poor nomads.^
The revolt of 19 16 was a powerful radicalizing experience for many
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Kazakh intellectuals.

Not all equivocated as Qazaq did:

in September,

19 16, the journal Ay gap was suspended for advocating support for the
52
rebels.

It was during this time, also, that the more extreme Ush Zhuz

group spread its support into Semirechye and northern Kazakhstan; it also
supported the revolt whole-heartedly.
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The Duma sent a special investigating committee to Central Asia at
the height of the revolt.

The committee, led by Alexander Kerensky and

including the leader of the Moslem fraction, Tevkelev, reported in secret
54
on September 10, 1916.

After discussions, the Duma in December issued

three questions to the government, never satisfactorily answered, which
blamed it for the revolt.

The Duma did not sympathize with the native

vict ims.
The 19 16 rebellion was truly a popular insurrection.

The elites did

not openly participate, a factor noted by an official report later:
But what was noticed was that the [Kazakh] youth searched
for a leader but did not find him, therefore the agitation took
the character of disorganization not different from the usual
friction caused by every new development in the national life.
This did not comprise a sign of rebellion or of agitation with
the aim of separation from R u s s i a . ^ 5 .
Another report found that, "in almost every volost the leaders of the
56
revolt were the volost starshinas."
A description from early January, 1917, describes the climate of
terror that followed the Russian retaliation:
The population has so suffered from the punitive units and
is so frightened that not only is it afraid to talk of any sort
of attack but even to think of one. . . . The former local bais
in the village do not, at present, appear as bais but as destitute
persons, ruined completely by the late disorders.^
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In 19 16, the wealthy and the nationalists remained on the side of
the establishment, while the poor and the young rose up in reckless
rebellion, and the majority of Kazakhs simply tried to survive.
Dulatov wrote in Qazaq:
disorder.

As

"Kazakhs have been ruined by this senseless

The cause of this terrible disaster lies in the Kazakhs 1

backwardness and their lack of culture."
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The Kazakh nation had not

recovered materially or in spirit, when the revolutionary and civil war
period crashed over the steppe.

The nationalist leaders were in place

to guide the Kazakhs through the trauma of war and famine, because to
some extent the traditional leaders were discredited by the disaster of
1916.
But the passion of the desperate Kazakh nomads who struggled in
the steppe in 19 16 is still echoed in the following rebel song, by the
fighting akyn Byzaubaq:
Tsar Nikolai is perplexed and upset:
The enemies 1 armies are closing in from all sides.
There are also not a few internal enemies,
Enemies are everywhere, and he's in despair.
And the miserable courtiers cry,
Give him advice, but it's all in vain.
They want to take all our youth,
Since they've not enough soldiers of their own.
But even if we give into them now,
And send our men far to strange shores,
What will it matter—the tsar will continue to oppress,
Even if we offer our lives for him.
But if, as one, we rise against them,
They will not be able to destroy us all, my people!
No, a tsar's heart knows no compassion.
Kazakhs, give your answer now to the tsar!
Is it worthwhile to live the life of a slave,
Only to reach a ripe old agje?
Listen to what the akyn sings to you:
Misery awaits you from the tsar's hands
Even if you offer your son to him.
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Go then, my people,
Go then, in war against the tsar!
Where now are the aksakals and wise leaders?
Or do we no longer have strength in our hands?
0 look!
They are leading your most beautiful ones to the tsar!
Why are you silent? Is there no heart in your breast?
0 youth! You are the beauty of our land!
The time has come! Just listen to the thunder of the storm!
To horse, then, and let your steel shine in the sun,
Like a deadly scythe in your hands!
The day of sharp suffering has dawned. . . .
0 come you all! Close your ranks, my people!
0 place no faith in cowards who speak sweetly to the foe.
To arms! Our land is calling to us!
0 my people! You are so strong, so proud, so much alive!
0 listen to my battlecry, to my fiery call!
You will be happy after bloody fight,
After defeating the enemies of your liberty.^9

CHAPTER SEVEN
Revolutionary Nationalism, 1917-1920

The [Kazakhs] received the first revolution with joy and
the second with consternation and terror. It is easy to
understand why. The first revolution had liberated them from
the oppression of the tsarist regime and reinforced their
perennial dream of autonomy. . . . The second revolution was
accompanied in the borderlands by violence, plundering,
exactions and by the establishment of a dictatorial regime
. . . in short, it was a period of sheer anarchy. In the past,
a small group of tsarist bureaucrats oppressed the [Kazakhs];
today the same group of people, or others, who cloak themselves
in the name of Bolsheviks perpetuate in the borderlands the
same regime. . . . Only the politics of Kolchak which promised
to return to the tsarist regime forced Alash Orda to turn
itself toward the Soviet regime, even though, judging by the
local Bolsheviks, it did not appear to be a very attractive
alternative.
—Baytursun, 19 19.

Modern Kazakh nationalism peaked during the crisis of 1917-1920,
when famine, anarcy, and civil war stalked Kazakhstan.
struggled simply to survive the hunger.
failed them in the 1916 uprising.

The Kazakh masses

The traditional leadership had

The intellectual leaders, though not

united, organized the only modern independent nation the Kazakhs would
ever know, the Alash in 1917, but they could not defend it during the war
years of 19 18-19.

With no other choice, the nationalists submitted to

the Communists in 1920.

They hoped only to intermediate between that

95

96

brave new Russian world and the desperate Kazakh people.

The dream of

Qazaqjylyq was over.
Famine ruled the Steppe during the entire revolutionary era.

2

The

Kazakh nomads had always faced the calamities of dzhut and drought, but
now they suffered the mass starvations of the modern age.

Russian

colonization had created great numbers of impoverished Kazakhs; then the
stress of war-time exactions and the collapse of distribution systems in
the empire during World War I had pushed them to the edge of disaster.
The revolt of 19 16, which ruined the harvest of that year and prevented
much of the next f s, which created hundreds of thousands of refugees, and
which caused the destruction of much livestock, led directly to the famine
which lasted until 1923.

The ravages of the Civil War, 1918-19, ensured

that starvation oppressed the Kazakh masses during this critical time.
The Kazakh intellectuals received word of the fall of the Empire in
late February, 1917, with guarded optimism, while the educated youth were
more enthusiastic.

The influence of

T youth

groups 1 among Kazakh students,

especially in the northern (Russian) areas, grew ever more significant as
their numbers grew and as they experienced the dramatic events from 1905
on.

The group "Birlik" ("Unity"), which formed in 19 15 in Omsk, was one

of the most important.

3

It included both Seifullin and Togzhanov, later

Communists, as well as other Kazakhs, who represented the more radical or
class-conscious intellectuals.

Another major group was "Jas Qazaq," or

"Young Kazakh," in Uralsk, which was closely tied to the moderate Qazaq
nationalists.

The formation of some twenty such groups in early 1917

indicates the fervor of the young intellectuals.
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The leading Kazakh nationalists regarded the February revolution as
the chance to return to the path of a federated Russian multinational
state which the early Duma era had promised.

However, the dominant

issue for the Kazakh nation remained the land problem, which solution was
necessary before they could hope to modernize the Kazakh herdsmen.

The

Provisional Government seemed more amenable to Kazakh concerns, but proved
too weak to fulfill its potential.
Its early actions were promising.

The mobilization decree which had

sparked the 19 16 revolt was rescinded March 9; Bukeykhanov was appointed
4
commissar of Turgay oblast, center of Kazakh resistance, on March 19.
The Provisional Government declared general amnesty for the rebels, and
ordered the return of over six million acres of nomad land seized but not
distributed to Russians in Semirechye.

However, the new Russian regime

would not install Tanyshbayev as agriculture minister, which would have
greatly increased Kazakh participation in solving the land problem.^

In

early April, the Provisional Government created the Turkestan Committee
to administer the southern oblasts, while the Steppe region was under
direct central control (as in tsarist days).

Its presidium of five

Russians and four Moslems included both Bukeykhanov and Tanyshbayev.
Finding itself impotent, this committee resigned in the summer.^
For the Kazakhs of Syr Darya and Semirechye, the situation in
Turkestan was chaotic.

The authority of the Provisional Government was

minimal; many tsarist officials remained in charge until April, with old
Kuropatkin himself only removed by arrest on March 31.^

The Russian

workers and soldiers formed the Tashkent Soviet March 5-6, which held
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the revolution was for Russians only, openly declaring itself anti-Moslem
at the Third Congress of Turkestan Soviets in mid-November, 19 17.
Moslems, meanwhile,

g

The

also convened congresses in Tashkent, creating the

Shura Islamiyeh or Moslem Central Council to represent the natives of
9

Turkestan.

Chairman of the Council was Mustafa Chokay (1890-194 1), the

brilliant young lawyer from the Kipchaks of Ak Mechet, Syr Darya.^
Chokay (Chokaev) had represented Kazakh interests while working for the
Moslem fraction in the Fourth Duma, and he maintained contact with the
Qazaq nationalists.

Among his associates in the Council was Tanyshbayev,

o
•
u
11
representing Semirechye.
In the Steppe itself, the Kazakhs held various councils and meetings
in early and middle 19 17, wherein the nationalists, the clergy, and the
elders sought common ground to unify the beleagured nation.

The weakness

of the Provisional Government was apparent, but the Kazakh leaders still
placed their hope in a democratic, federated future.

However, the Qazaq

moderates were opposed both by southern, anti-Russian Kazakhs and by more
radicalized, quasi-socialist educated youths.
In mid-March, 1917, Kolbay Togusov of the Ush Zhuz held a meeting in
Tashkent.

By this time, Togusov had split with the anti-Russian southern

Kazakhs, the meeting including Turar Ryskulov, already supporting the
Tashkent Soviet and soon to join the Communist Party.

12

Two weeks later,

Togusov had moved north to Kazalinsk, where he led a meeting of over
5,000 Central Asian workers.
A large conference held in Uralsk about this time exemplifies the
character of Kazakh nationalism in the early revolutionary months.

13

The
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attending clerics, who refused to allow women to be present and who
protested the Western dress of the secular nationalists, joined with the
conservative leadership to resist the proposals of the secularists.

But

though the Kazakh leadership continued to be divided, the very process of
organizing meetings increased their political skills and maintained
contact with the Kazakh masses.
During March and April, the nationalist group centered about the
journal Qazaq created the political party called Alash Orda.

14

The

founders included Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, Dulatov, H. Dosmukhammedov,
Tanyshbayev, 0. Omerov, and A. Zhuzhdybayev.

At a major conference held

in Turgay and at the so-called "Pan-Kirghiz Congress" in Orenburg, the
moderate Alash Orda leaders limited their demands to the return of lands
seized illegally, mandatory universal education, the use of the Kazakh
language in schools and government, and limited self-government.

They

sought greater religious freedom; they also supported continuing Russia 7 s
involvement in World War I, including renewing the labor mobilization.
The nationalists were clearly opting to remain within the Russian state.
In early May, the First Ail-Russian Moslem Congress was held in
Moscow.^

Leading members of the Alash Orda attended, and Dosmukhammedov

was elected to the executive all-Russian Moslem Council, the Milli Shura.
The Congress had been convened on Tatar initiative with a goal being to
create a pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic political movement in Russia.

However,

the Kazakhs maintained their antipathy to Tatar-led pan-Turkism, and the
congress foundered on the question of whether the Moslems should seek a
unitary state with cultural autonomy, or a federative state with full
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territorial autonomy.

The delegates voted for the latter, 460 to 27 1.

Dosmukhammedov attacked the unitarian position and Tatar-dominated panTurkism, expressing the Kazakh understanding of a unique nationalism:
Do you have any idea what a nationality is? It is the
unity of blood, spirit, culture, traditions, language, customs,
and territory. You cannot create a 'Moslem 1 nation on the basis
of a non-territorial, centralized autonomy.^
Thereafter, the Kazakhs rejected the pan-Islamic, unitarian efforts
of Russian Moslems to focus on strengthening Kazakh nationalism.

In

June, 19 17, two journals began which revealed the opposing currents of
that nationalism.

The first, Sary Arqa, which began in Semipalatinsk,

was the paper of the Jas Qazaq group, and thus was an extension of
Qazaq.^ ^

These papers urged political autonomy for the Kazakhs, and

carried the debate over its potential form:
. . . if it is decided that autonomy is needed, what
form is more acceptable to the Kazakhs; state autonomy or
regional autonomy? If we come to a formula of regional
autonomy what shall be its basis, territoriality or the
peculiarities of culture (nationality)? Can the Kazakhs
lay claim to an independent autonomy or establish it in
unity with other peoples?^
The other journal, Birlik Tuuy ("Flag of Union"), was begun in
Tashkent, and it represented the more radicalized, anti-Russian southern
Kazakhs.
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Its editor-in-chief was Mustafa Chokay, and its contributors

included S. Khodzhanov and Dulatov of the Alash Orda.

This paper was

much more influenced by pan-Islam; its Turkestani proclivity was shown by
its nickname, Kurama gazetasy, or "Half-breed," because its language was
Kazakh thoroughly mixed with Uzbek.
The Second "Pan-Kirghiz" Congress was held in Orenburg July 21-28.
It was led by Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, Dulatov, and Dosmukhammedov.

It

20

101

reaffirmed and strengthened the resolutions of April, calling for the end
of colonization and the return of seized but unused lands, mandatory
education, the use of the Kazakh language, an independent Kazakh muftiate,
and non-clerical courts.

The rights of women were affirmed and the kalym

abolished, indicating the decline both of traditional and Islamic custom
was a goal of the secular nationalists who now led the intellectual elite.
At this congress, Baytursun advocated complete independence, while
Bukeykhanov argued for national autonomy within
Russian state.

a democratic, federated

Bukeykhanov f s position dominated.

The congress created

the Alash Orda political party, and worked out the procedures for broadbased representation for an all-union congress to be held in November,
when the autonomous government would be proclaimed.

The Kazakh moderates

still sought only the economic and cultural protection of autonomy within
the stronger, modernizing Russian state.

Between July and November, a

number of regional conferences supported the results of the Second
Congress.

In the Steppe, the majority of Kazakhs supported the Alash

Orda.
However, a congress of Syr Darya Kazakhs held in Tashkent in early
August was much more radical.
returning to Semirechye.

During the summer, the 1916 refugees began

A 'peasants' congress' in Vernyi in July had

resolved to suppress the nomads, and Russian militias had engaged in such
massacres that protest riots broke out in Tashkent in August.

The

Tashkent Kazakh congress called for protection of the Semirechye nomads,
proposed greater autonomy than Alash Orda, and resolved that Birlik Tuuy
become the official journal of the Kazakh nation (even as Qazaq had been
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designated in April by the Alash Ordists).

21

Responding to the Tashkent

protests, the Provisional Government placed Semirechye under martial law
in September and sent an investigating commitee.

Like so much of its

efforts, the Provisional Government's involvment consisted of promises it
was unable to keep, due to the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution.
The October revolution brought even greater chaos to Central Asia.
The Russian colonists seized the Bolshevik platform of a proletariat
dictatorship to justify complete suppression of the native efforts for
autonomy.

Because Central Asia lacked a native proletariat, only the

Russians could lead the revolution, and only for Russian benefit.

The

Civil War which barred the European Bolsheviks from Central Asia gave the
local Bolsheviks free rein.

The result was an anarchic struggle between

native autonomists such as the Alash Orda, rovi.ug White and Cossack
armies, bands of peasant Greens, and Red troops made up both of settler
militias and European Bolsheviks.
The long-planned pre-congress planning sessions convened by the
Alash Orda in Orenburg occurred only two weeks after the October
revolution.

The Tashkent Soviet had immediately overthrown the feeble

Provisional administration.
Soviet.

Bolsheviks seized control of the Orenburg

Whereas the Kazakh nationalists had been developing their

program within the Russian federative context, the October revolution
completely overturned that goal.

The Kazakh leaders now faced the

necessity of independence; the alternatives were alliance with the local
Bolsheviks, their Russian tormentors in new clothes, or with the Whites,
who sought to reestablish the system the Kazakhs had been fighting.
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The mid-November conference in Orenburg was designed to organize the
framework of the crucial Third "Pan-Kirghiz" Congress set for December.
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The creation of an autonomous Kazakh government was necessary because of
the vacuum of authority in the Steppe.

The delegates from across

Kazakhstan, whose familiarity with the Bolsheviks was as yet minimal,
wished to create a "Kirghiz Provisional Government" which would be an
autonomous republic within a democratic Russian federation.

This Kazakh-

Kirghiz government would control internal affairs to protect the native
nations, but would provide free speech and assembly for all.

The state

would manage political and criminal affairs, including an independent
militia and graduated taxation; an Islamic clerical administration would
control religious afffairs (including marriage).
would be run by the state.
problem was prominent:

Universal education

Of course, the primary concern of the land

the conferees demanded the return of all lands

seized by the Russians, as part of the priority to be given henceforth to
the Kazakhs in the land issue.
Latter November, 1917, witnessed a great deal of revolutionary
activity in Central Asia.
in Omsk.

Togusov formed the Ush Zhuz political party

By now the Ush Zhuz was still pan-Islamic but veering left to

socialism, and eventually its members joined the Bolsheviks during 19 1819.

The Ush Zhuz, arisen in anti-Russian Turkestan, had taken hold in

the Russian-dominated northern towns; its combination of Islam and
socialism was not unique in the Russian Moslem world during the
revolutionary era, but it guaranteed that the Ush Zhuz would remain small
and isolated from the traditional masses much more than the moderates.
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The Ush Zhuz party was headquartered in Omsk, with Mikhay Aytpenev as
president, and Togusov and Shakhmardan Elzhanov as vice-presidents.
included Shaimerdin Alimzhanov and formerBirlikers 1 ike -Seifullin.

It
The

Ush Zhuzists had participated in the "pan-Kirghiz" congresses and other
meetings during 1917 and represented the leading opposition to the Alash
Orda, which they regarded as too willing to collaborate with moderate and
conservative Russians.
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Also in late November, the Moslem nationalists of Turkestan held the
"Fourth Extraordinary Regional Moslem Congress" in the ancient city of
Kokand.
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They declared the Moslem Provisional Autonomous Government of

Turkestan, which news was wildly received by Tashkent's Moslems, where
the Tahskent Soviet ruled.
government:

Two Kazakhs were named to head the Kokand

Tanyshbayev, and in January, Chokay (due to the former's

ill-fated attempt to float a loan to protect the fledgling regime).

The

fluid nature of the times is shown by Tanyshbayev's many roles as an
appointee of the Russian Provisional Government, leading member of the
Alash Orda, and first president of the Turkestan Autonomous Government.
The Third "pan-Kirghiz" Congress met December 5-13, 1917.
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The

congress established the Kazakh-Kirghiz government, to be called Alash.
The delegates, who represented all four Steppe oblasts, both Turkestan
oblasts with Kazakh-Kirghiz populations, Samarkand, and the Altai,
resolved that only a Kazakh-run government could effectively administer
Kazakhstan in the crisis of anarchy and famine.

The government of Alash

Orda would control all "state land" and manage it for the best interests
of all residents, with Kazakh needs to be first.

Alash would encompass
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the oblasts of Uralsk, Akmolinsk, Turgay, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, and
Syr Darya, as well as the Kazakh regions of Transcaspia and the Kirghiz
regions of Turkestan.

The capital would be in Semipalatinsk.

The congress declared that "Kirghizia" would be an autonomous
republic within a federated Russian republic.

The government would

consist of an executive soviet (sic), as well as oblast committees.

It

would organize and maintain a Kazakh militia raised from each oblast and
supported by central taxation.
fiscal affairs.

The government would tax and regulate

It would also organize local elections to a constituent

assembly, draft a constitution, and directly negotiate with its neighbors.
The presidium of this congress was chaired by Kulmanov, and included
Bukeykhanov, Dosmukhammedov, Azim Kenisarin, and 0. Karasy, with D.
Galiev, Seid Kadirbayev, and Dulatov as secretaries.

The government of

Alash Orda was to be run by a provisional popular soviet with twenty-five
members, of whom ten were to be non-Kazakh to ensure minority rights.

The

congress then came to the issue of declaring autonomy, and here developed
a controversy which nearly broke up the conference.

The majority of

delegates wished to delay announcement until a militia could be formed
and negotiations with the Syr Darya and Semirechye Kazakhs for annexation
could be conducted.

All the nationalists realized that, without military

power, the Alash Orda was futile.

But the minority, led by Bukeykhanov

and including the Uralsk, Bukey Horde, and Syr Darya representatives,
demanded immediate announcement.

The factions compromised by delaying

the actual inauguration of the autonomous government until January, and
Bukeykhanov was elected chairman of the new government.
the dream of Qazaqjylyq seemed to be realized.

For a moment,
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The Civil War began in earnest in early January, 19 18.
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The Tashkent

Soviet sent Red troops which sacked Kokand in early February; thousands
were killed and the Turkestan Autonomous Government was destroyed.

Red

troops seized much of northern and western Kazakhstan's major towns
during January.

The Cossack troops of the Ural, Irtysh, and Semirechye

Hosts established "White Guard" counter-revolutionary armies to battle
the Reds in northern, western, and southeastern Kazakhstan.

The

Czechoslovak Legion, tsarist POWs being shipped home, seized control of
the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

The anti-Bolshevik Komuch government was

created in Samara in June, and the All-Russian Directory in Omsk in
September.

Armies of Russian Reds, Whites, and Greens struggled against

each other, while Kazakh and other Central Asian militias surged on the
peripheries.

The Kazakh masses, already hard-pressed merely to survive

the famine, were forced to pay taxes and requisitions of food and clothing
to whoever currently held sway in their region.

During 1918, the fortunes

of war favored the Whites (Dutov in Western Kazakhstan, Kolchak in
Northern).

But by 1919, the Bolsheviks were clearly in the ascendancy.

During 1918, the influence of the Ush Zhuz group declined.

However,

the Kazakhs of Turgay, Uralsk, and Transcaspia who had played a major
role in the 1916 revolt now rose up against the Whites and their allies.
Dzhangildin, now a Bolshevik himself, was sent to the Steppe to agitate
among the fiercely anti-Russian southwestern tribes, the Adai (Adaev)
in particular, as well as the Bukey Horde intellectuals who had usually
27
resisted alliance with the Alash Orda nationalists.

Like the Ush

Zhuz, these intellectuals were not so much pro-Bolshevik as they were
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anti-Alash Orda.

During the critical years 1916 to 1920, the dynamic

cleavages of the Kazakh intellectual elites meant that a great majority
of Kazakhs supported the moderate or "bourgeoisie" Alash Orda, while small
but significant minorities who opposed the Alash Orda for its upper-class
leadership (Ush Zhuz), its compromise with Russian liberals over full
independence (the southern Kazakhs), its individual leaders (the Bukey
Horde intellectuals), and its role in the 19 16 revolt (the Turgay tribes),
allied themselves with the Bolsheviks or otherwise refused cooperation.
In early 19 18, the Alash Orda leaders sought to ally themselves with
various neighboring groups.

Initial contacts with the Kokand Government,

itself run by Alash Orda Kazakhs, were aborted by the vicious February
massacre (which Chokay escaped).

The Turkestan Bolsheviks and the

Semirechye peasants were violently anti-native and anti-nomad.

The

Cossacks had long been the neighbors of the Kazakhs, but the suppression
of the 1916 uprising was too recent.
to an invitation from Moscow,

Thus, in March, 1918, in response

the Alash Orda met with Lenin.
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The Bolshevik nationality policy has been thoroughly examined
29
elsewhere.

. .
In practical terms, the policy during the Civil War was

designed to entice the regional native autonomists to ally with the
Bolsheviks, promising national "self-determination" in contrast to the
reactionary Whites.

The Commissariat for Nationalities 1 Affairs, or

Narkomnats, was created in November, 1917, with Stalin as head.

It

sent Dzhangildin to organize western Kazakhstan, forming a special
"Kirghiz" bureau in May.

In December, 1917, Lenin and Stalin had

issued the famous Appeal to Moslems.

Although the Alash Orda rejected
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the Bolsheviks for usurping the Provisional Government, in early 19 18,
the Kazakh nationalists recognized the precariousness of their situation.
Halel Dosmukhammedov and his brother, Muhammadjan, Alash Orda
leaders of Uralsk, were dispatched to Moscow in March, 19 18, to confer
with Bolshevik leaders.

They were promised that the Bolsheviks adhered

to national self-determination and that Kazakh autonomy was achievable
under Communist rule.

Halel Gabbasov, one of the top Alash leaders, went

to Moscow in mid-April to meet Stalin.

Gabbasov broke off the talks

shortly, however, and returned to Kazakhstan rejecting Bolshevik rule.
30
By May, the Alash Orda was firmly anti^Bolshevik.

By this time, the

Bolsheviks had instituted mass conscription and their nationalization
decrees, both of which caused great hostility among the Central Asians
and cemented their opposition to the Communist regime.
In May, the so-called White Congress witnessed formal military
alliance between the Ural Cossacks and the Alash Orda; on May 18, the
first Kazakh militia fought along side the Semipalatinsk Cossacks; by
June, Cossack-trained Kazakh units were fighting in Semipalatinsk,
Akmolinsk, Semirechye, and Turgay (Uralsk being firmly in Red hands);
in early August, a formal military alliance was created by Bukeykhanov
31
and Dutov.
The great vastness of Kazakhstan hindered Alash Orda communications
from the start, so that in practical terms the Kazakh government had two
foci, the "Alash Orda center" in Semipalatinsk, under Bukeykhanov, and
the "Alash Orda West," located in the Uralsk town of Dzhambeity, which was
32
under Halel Dosmukhammedov.

Thus, during the Civil War, the central (or
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Eastern) Alash Orda allied itself with the Siberian government in Omsk,
while the Western cooperated with the Ural Cossacks and the Komuch
government.

The Alash Orda was forced to ally with the Whites despite

their blatant rejection of autonomy for non-Russians.
In September, 19 18, the Alash Orda joined with the Komuch and other
regional governments in a conference in Ufa to form an anti-Bolshevik
provisional government.
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The conference formulated a future federative

Russian republic composed of autonomous regions, and rejected the
Bolshevik regime.

The delegates elected a presidium of twenty, with

six Turkic leaders among them, including Chokay (representing Turkestan)
and Dosmukhammedov (Alash Orda West).

The declaration was eventually

signed by Kazakh, Bashkir, and Tatar leaders.

Kazakh signatories were

Bukeykhanov, Chokay, A. Alimbekov, G. Alibekov, Beremzhanov, and
34
Baytursun.

Although the Komuch failed, the following speech by

Bukeykhanov indicates how the moderate Alash Ordists still hoped to
create a federative Russian republic:
Citizens! I have been sent here by the Moslem members of
the Consituent Assembly, by the governments of the autonomous
regions of Turkestan, Bashkurdistan, Alash-Orda, and by the
National Administration of Turko-Tata.rs of the Interior of
Russia and Siberia.
Until the February Revolution, Russia was an autocracy.
The February Revolution promised to give us a government by
the people . . . and to realize the age-old ideals of the
Russian intelligentsia. The non-Russian peoples of old
autocratic Russia joined the democratic part of Russia,
republican Russia, in the hope that the All-Russian Constituent
Assembly would establish popular government . . ., but our
hopes . . . were defeated. Power was seized by demogogues who
wished to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat . . .
[but actually] introduced a reign of anarchy, disruption, and
the absence of all government. It was under such conditions
that regional governments began to appear. These governments
were absolutely necessary; without them it would have been
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impossible to govern the region liberated from the Bolsheviks.
There are those who ascribe the organization of regional
governments to separatism, but they are wrong. The organizations
in the name of which I now speak do not adhere to the separatist
point of view. They consider themselves to be parts of an
undivided Russia and believe that the autonomous regions could
have played no role in the concert of Powers had they formed
independent states. We are at one with a democratic federated
Russian republic . . . and shall go hand in hand with the
Russian people to create a great and happy Russia.^5
Despite such expressions of fealty, the Alash Orda was not treated
as an equal partner by the Siberian anti-Bolshevik government in Omsk.
The growing disarray among the anti-Bolshevik forces had led Admiral
Kolchak to overthrow the Directory in November, 1918.

The White leaders

regarded the national autonomists as distractions in their goal to revive
the Empire.

On Nov. 4, the Kolchak government ordered the suppression

of Alash Orda and commanded its militia units to subordinate themselves
36
to the White Guards.

The increasing hostility of the Whites to the

nationalists led to the situation described by Baytursun in the quote
at the beginning of this chapter.

By late 1918 and during early 1919,

the Kazakh nationalists, witnessing the military decline of the Whites,
had turned again towards compromise with the Bolsheviks.
The height of the Alash Orda government, then, was 1918.

Soviet

historiography has long vilified the Alash Orda group as reactionary
feudal-patriarchs and bourgeois nationalists* and documentary materials
are virtually unavailable.

Olcott, who had access to some archival

Alash materials, provides the details of three Alash Orda government
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sessions in 1918.
The session of June 11-24 was concerned primarily with the land
question; it issued the Statute "On Provisional Land Utilization on the

Territory of the Autonomous Alash."

All Kaazkh lands that had been

seized for Russian colonization but not allotted were to be returned to
the original owners; disputes over land between Kazakhs would be settled
by aksakals, between Kazakhs and Russians by elected zemstvo committees.
Both Russians and Kazakhs who lost lands were to receive compensation
from the government.

It declared private ownership of land but state

control of water resources, it urge.

This session also nullified all

Soviet decrees and stipulated treason trials for Kazakh Bolsheviks.
The session of July 24, 19 18, concentrated on regularizing local
government (with uezd soviets), forming the militias (thirty horsemen
per volost), and taxation.

Some indication of the support of the Kazakh

masses for the Alash Orda is revealed by the 3 million rubles which Alash
Orda collected in Akmolinsk alone, in 1918.

The class differences of

Kazakh leaders emerged in the political battle between G. Alibekov and
Dosmukhammedov over graduated versus flat tazation.

Dosmukhammedov y/as

the victor (each Kazakh household was to pay a flat 100 rubles per year);
thereupon, Alibekov and his group, called Ak Zhol (White Road), left the
Alash Orda to join the Bolsheviks.
The session of September 11, meeting in Ufa, formally recognized the
East-West split of the Alash government.

The Alash Orda West was to be

led by the Dosmukhammedovs, Kulmanov, Turmuhammadov, and two Russians;
its sphere was Uralsk, Turgai, the Bukey Horde, Mangyshlak (northern
Transcaspia), and Aktyubinsk.

The central Alash Orda would retain basic

control.
In December, 1918, disaffection for the Whites permeated the Kazakh
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leadership and ranks.
38
protest on Dec. 7.

The Alash Orda West had to suppress a pro-Bolshevik
At the same time, the Bashkir nationalists led by

Vakhitov were abandoning Kolchak, and they met with Alash Ordists to
discuss joining the Bolsheviks.
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The willingness of the Kazakhs to

go over to the Reds by middle 19 19 contrasts with the situation a year
earlier:

in March, 19 18, Dzhangildin had convened a "Turgay Congress of

Soviets" at which only one (then, three) of the delegates was a
40
Bolshevik.
In January, 19 19, General M. V. Frunze, commander of the Red armies
of the Eastern Front, called on the Kazakh nationalists to join the
41
Bolsheviks, and he promised a general amnesty.

In February, the

Bashkir nationalists had gone over to the Communists, and their troops
were taken into the Red Army.

Dzhangildin managed to convene a meeting

with an Alash Orda delegation in March; using the Bashkir example, he
managed to convince Baytursun himself that by joining the Bolsheviks, the
42
Alash Orda would be serving the best interests of the desperate Kazakhs.
On March 22, Dzhangildin

telegraphed Moscow:

completed of all the laboring

"Unification is now

Kirghiz [Kazakh] people under the Red
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banner of the worker-peasant government."
In June, Baytursun met with Lenin, Stalin, and Dzhangildin in
Moscow.

As a result of their discussions, Lenin signed the order creating

44
the "Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee," or Kirrevkom, on July 10.

This

embryonic Soviet Kazakh government was chaired by the Russian S.
Pestkowski, with principal Russian member S. Dimanshtein, ally of Stalin
on the Narkomnats; Kazakh members, though actually mere figureheads,
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included Dzhangildin as well as Seitkali Mendeshev (Mindash-uli), A.
Aitiev, A. Kulatov, and A. Adveev.

The authority of Kirrevkom held

only in the so-called Inner Side (Bukey Horde), though it claimed to
control the entire Steppe region.

The creation of Kirrevkom in mid-

1919 signalled the end of Alash Orda.
The rapid retreat of White forces in latter 1919 allowed the direct
intervention of Moscow in Central Asia for the first time in two years.
The so-called Turkestan Commission (Turkkomissiya), created in October,
45
reached Tashkent in November.

Composed of Bolshevik Russians like

Frunze, V. Kuibyshev, la. Rudzutak, and F. Goloshchekin, the Turkkomissiya
included the Kazakh Communist Turar Ryskulov, who was head of the Musburo
or Moslem Bureau.

Ryskulov's role in the struggle of the Turkestanis to

create a Turkic Communist Party and Turkestan Soviet Republic is properly
46
outside the scope of the purely Kazakh nationalism of Qazaqjylyq.
However, Ryskulov was one of the most important Kazakhs of the entire
revolutionary era, and his contribution to the development of "Moslem
National Communism" was significant in both Communist and Third-World
history.

Regarding the Alash Orda nationalists, Ryskulov represented

those southern Kazakhs who were both pan-Turkic and socially radicalized.
By late 1919, the Red forces were mopping up resistance in Siberia
and the Steppe; the last battles for Semirechye were won by early 1920.
The Alash Orda government, always thinly-spread and never well-defended,
more or less disintegrated.

The journal Qazaq had disappeared in 19 18,

its Orenburg presses destroyed; Sary Arqa, which had carried on for
47
Qazaq, also was discontinued.

Most of the nationalist writers

1 14

joined the staffs of various early Bolshevik papers, such as Durystyk
zholy (Path of Truth, Urda), Ushqyn (The Spark, Orenburg), Qazaq tili
(Kazakh Word, Semipalatinsk), and Izvestiia Kirgizskogo kraia (News of
the Kirghiz Region).

The last anti-Bolshevik Kazakh nationalist paper

was Qazaq sozu (Voice of the Kazakhs), by A. Bulatov, which began in
Semipalatinsk and moved eastward with Kolchak T s retreat, from September
1919.
By the fall of 1919, the Communists were sufficiently certain of
their hold on Kazakhstan to convene a Kirrevkom conference to prepare
for a constituent congress of Kazakh soviets.

The Bolsheviks sought to

deny suffrage to all clergy, former tsarist and Alash officials, bais,
and village elders.

Baytursunov was able to battle this plan, which he

declared amounted to "depriving the Kazakh people of its representation,
and suspension of its rights to express its own will through its most
..48
capable representatives.
The majority of Alash Ordists crossed to the Communist side in late
49
1919 and early 1920.

The Military Revolutionary Soviet (Revvoensovet)

declared a general amnesty for Alash Orda on November 5, and the Alash
leaders formally recognized the Communist Party on November 10.

A

conference between the Alash Orda and Revvoensovet took place December
10-24 in Orenburg, during which the Kazakh nationalists negotiated their
surrender to the Communists.
The Alash Orda officially ended at the second conference, held
January 11-20.^
militia.

Kirrevkom liquidated the Alash and disbanded its

Baytursun was placed on the committee, while Tanyshbayev was
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made commissar of Semirechye, and Bukeykhanov of Turgay.

The apparent

harmony of this momentous change, however, was disturbed by Pestkowski's
insistence on Russian domination and his antagonism to the nationaliststurned-Communists.

Baytursun, along with the former Social Democrat

Sedelnikov, a Russian, sought to create a locally-controlled Communist
apparatus in Central Asia, to "give effective and real guarantee for the
self-determination of the peoples of the Kazakh, Bashkir, and Turkestan
autonomous republics.*

Baytursun and Sedelnikov carried their arguments

with Kirrevkom all the way to Lenin, with secret telegrams and personal
visits, in the spring of 1920.

Although their efforts failed, they

ecouraged the young Kazakh Communists with their example; as a Kazakh
Orgburo (Organizational Bureau) report stated, "Sedelnikov has become the
leader of Kazakh nationalism and is conducting an open chauvinistic fight
against Communism.

»,52

During the spring and summer, while the nationalists discovered what
their role in the Communist government was to be, leading Kazakh, Bashkir,
Tatar, and Turkestani nationalists may have met clandestinely to form the
53
secret organization Ittihad ve Taraqqi (Union and Progress).

Although

very little is known of this group, which could be a Soviet fabrication,
it apparently sought to maintain an anti-Russian, anti-Communist movement
alive within the Party itself.

Baytursun and Bukeykhanov were reputed

members, as well as Ryskulov.
On August 26, 1920, the "Kirghiz" Autonomous Soviet Socialist
54
Republic was formed, within the RSFSR.
Sedelnikov were removed from Kirrevkom.

At this time, Baytursun and
The capital was Orenburg, and
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the KASSR included the former tsarist regions of Uralsk, Turgay, the Inner
Side (Bokey Horde), Mangyshlak, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk.

Although

the Kazakhs of Syr Darya and Semirechye agitated for inclusion in the
new autonomous republic, they remained part of the Turkestan SSR (created
in April, 1920).
The last major role of Alash Orda occurred at the constituent
assembly which met in Orenburg on October 4-12, 1920."^

Over 700

delegates participated, with some 270 eligible to vote (including 197
Communists).

The Turgay and Uralsk representatives were strongly

Communist, recalling the roles of Amangeldy and Dzhangildin, and formed
over half the delegation.

The other half grouped around the Alash Orda

leaders Baytursun and Bukeykhanov.

The congress banned further Russian

colonization, it elected a central committee and Council of People's
Commissars, and it published the manifesto of the Kazakh constitution,
"Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring Kirghiz (Kazakh) Autonomous
Republic."

By this time, the Kazakh nationalists were all too aware

that their position was precarious.

However, they had joined the new

regime out of the deep desire to protect the Kazakh people as best they
could, and despite their failure to create a true autonomous republic,
they did not abandon working for the Kazakh cause from within the system.
A delegate to the constituent congress, A. Nakhimjan, one of the
young new Kazakh Communists, recalls the words of Togzhanov, quoted
earlier, when he described the assembly in his memoirs thusly:
We came to the first all-Kirghiz (Kazakh) congress . . .
united with the Alash Orda intellectuals, many of whom, under
Baytursunov, were delegates. Hence, it is not surprising that
we joined the [Communist] party still dominated by an Alash
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Orda ideology . . . Before going to the [Communist] faction's
conference, we usually received directions from our Alash Orda
leaders, and after the faction gathering we would report what
had happened at the meeting of RKP(b).^"
The Kazakh nationalists between 19 17 and 1920 were thrust too
quickly into the revolutionary world, while the Kazakh people were too
desperate to survive the great famine to participate in determining
their own future.

The Alash Orda moderates had struggled to conceptualize

and formalize the first modern Kazakh national government, and they
succeeded much better than one might have supposed beforehand.

A nation-

state is created not just by intellectuals, however, and the twin hammerblows of the 1916 uprising and the great famine deprived them of the full
support of the several million Kazakhs they represented.

The dream of

Qazaqjylyq had required adequate time and education, as well as full
bellies the Kazakhs needed full minds.

Anything was possible, in the

revolutionary flush of 19 17; it seemed probable, in the days of 1918
when the Alash Orda ran the country; but it faded with the military
decline of 1919, and by 1920, it was a half-forgotten dream amidst the
sad, grim necessity of submitting, yet again, to the Russian masters.

CONCLUSION

Settlement is collectivization. Settlement is the
liquidation of the bai semi-feudals. Settlement is the
destruction of tribal attitudes . . . Settlement is
simultaneously the question of socialist construction and
the approach of socialism, of the socialist reconstruction
of the Kazakh mass without divisions by nationality under
the leadership of the vanguard of the proletariat and the
Communist party.
,
—Goloshchekin, 1932.
Those who used to be slaves and serfs,
Have now been made heroes by the Turksib
[Turkestan-Siberian Railroad].
The simple shepherd, tempered by work,
Has now become dispatcher of the train,
And thus gained batyr-like power.
He used to herd the sheep, and beat them
with the whip,
But now with steady hand,
He draws the diagram of railroad traffic.
^
—Anonymous, c. 1930.

Modern Kazakh nationalism blossomed and withered in one generation.
The Kazakh intellectual nationalists arose from the modernization of
Kazakhstan under Russian rule, they matured swiftly under difficult
.
.
.
3
conditions, and they were destroyed by the Sovietization of Kazakhstan.
Nearly every single significant Kazakh nationalist and most of the early
Kazakh Communists were purged from the mid-1920s to 1938.
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In the same
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period, the regime destroyed the Kazakh traditional elite with a series
of "reforms" intended as a cultural revolution.

Finally, just as the

Kazakh people were recovering from a decade of famine, civil war, and
desperation, with a resurgence of (at least partial) nomadism, the
Soviets collectivized them with a tremendous toll of Kazakh life.

By

1938, the Kazakh nation had been broken on the Soviet Union f s wheel of
modernizat ion.
When the Communist Party created the "Kirghiz" ASSR in 1920, they
made Orenburg the capital.

By 1924, the republic had incorporated Syr

Darya and Semirechye, and the capital was moved

to Kzyl-Orda ("Red

Horde;" formerly Perovsk); Orenburg and Omsk were transferred to the
RSFSR.

In April, 1925, the First Kazakh Congress of Soviets officially

changed the designation "Kirghiz" to "Kazakh;" for the first time in
their Russian history, the Kazakhs could use their own name.

In mid-

1929, Alma Ata (formerly Vernyi, in Semirechye) became the capital of
Kazakhstan.

,/

Finally, with the "Stalin constitution" of 1936, Kazakhstan

was elevated to full republic status, becoming the second largest SSR in
the Soviet Union.
During this period, the Alash Orda nationalists struggled within the
Party and state organizations to preserve Kazakh culture.

The famine was

exceptionally severe in 192 1 in Kazakhstan, where an estimated one million
people starved to death; hundreds of thousands of destitute Kazakhs lined
railways hoping for food-aid, while the estimated herd-size in 1923 was
Z|.
only one-third of the pre-19 16 level.

The regime had no choice but to

allow the New Economic Policy in Kazakhstan, given its dire condition,
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while the (ex-)nationalists had to accommodate the Party's control to
ensure as much aid was given the people as could be.

The masses, of

course, could hardly resist or participate in any way with the changes.
In the early 1920s, the government instituted a series of landreforms that redistributed over one million acres in southern Kazakhstan;
however, the Kazakh nationalists suffered a bitter defeat when Lenin
backed the Russian Communists in not allowing the return of lands seized
before 1918.

In mid-1921, the Party purged many ex-Alash Ordists, though

their leaders remained, isolated; in early 1922, Baytursun was dismissed
from his post as minister of education (recalling his trouble as a teacher
in the tsarist era).

Within the Communist party, the pro-nationalists

('rights*) and the 'lefts' debated the role of the Alash Ordists; by
1923, they were disgraced, and their opposition to Soviet policies was
labelled "national deviationism."

By 1926, all the Alash Ordists were

removed from government and party; Bukeykhanov was publicly condemned at
this time.^

At the same time, however, the Soviets implemented their

"nativization" policy (korenizatsiia) to greatly increase the role of
Kazakhs in the Party and state.
In the mid-1920s, the economic situation of the Kazakh masses slowly
recovered, so that their herds had returned to prewar levels by 1927.
The unforeseen result of this recovery was the resurgence of the Kazakh
traditional leadership (mullahs, bais, aksakals) to authority among the
masses.

The first Soviet elections in Kazakhstan, in early 1921, and

despite disenfranchisement of the "ruling class," the Party suffered
humiliation as the Kazakhs placed their non-Communist traditional leaders
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over the Communist candidates.

The results of the 1925-26 elections were

even worse (88% of those elected being herders or farmers, not poor).

By

1927, rather than improved, the situation was worse, so that the elections
of

T 28

were postponed; and a popular slogan of the 1930 campaigns was

"Soviets without Communists."^

Clearly, the traditional leaders were

challenging the regime.
The atomization of Kazakh society in the early 1900s, with the
breakdown of larger Kazakh authority and the growth of "aul-communes"
that were small groups much more associational than consanguineal, had
promoted the local leader to great importance.

With the recovery of

Kazakh nomadic herding, the traditional leaders were the primary
obstacle to Soviet control of the common Kazakh.

Therefore, the regime

launched various confiscation, education, and cultural campaigns
designed to eliminate traditional authority.

The Koshchi (Poorman)

Union was created, Red Caravans and Red Yurts travelled the Steppe with
teachers and doctors, a mass literacy campaign was begun, and several
waves of livestock-confiscations emanated.

Perhaps the least-known but

most wrenching Soviet effort was the so-called khudzhum ("assault, storm")
of the late

f 20s;

this Soviet effort to crash-emancipate Central Asian

Moslem women created a tremendous Islamic male backlash that resulted in
g
the killing of thousands of women and their male supporters.

Though

many individuals suffered, these campaigns all failed to liquidate the
traditional leadership (e.g., the Koshchi Union was controlled by local
leaders, becoming in effect anti-Communist; and the repeated waves of
purges of Kazakhs in the Party showed how the traditionals were even
becoming "Communist" to preserve their authority^).

Even the policy of
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"Sovietization of the Kazakh Aul," a unique Soviet effort to substitute
loyalty to the regime for loyalty to the aul, failed, though in its
development, the Party debated and rejected the Kazakh argument (by
both right and left) that Kazakh nomadism was different from settled
agriculture and ought to be treated as such.*^
Ultimately, the Soviets were only able to eliminate the traditional
leaders by destroying their very society.
Kazakh culture was ominous.
was begun.
awful.

In 1929, the collectivization of Kazakhstan

Of all the tragedies of Kazakh history, this is the most

Simple statistics overwhelm.

population of perhaps four million.
T 20s,

The rejection of the unicity of

Over one million Kazakhs died—in a
Having barely recovered by the late

Kazakh nomadic socio-economy was shattered; the traditional elites

and the stubborn masses were broken.
The details of the collectivization drive of 1929-38 in Kazakhstan
are related at length by Olcott and Robert Conquest, as well as many
others.**

The following facts are provided only to dramatize that story.

The Soviets had undertaken numerous livestock, grain, and other
requisitions and confiscations from early 1918 onward.

The Kazakh herdsmen

therefore responded immediately and drastically to the last, greatest
assault.

The Kazakhs were rounded up and compressed, herds and all, into

hastily-erected collectives in the Steppe.

Rapidly, the overcrowded

animals perished as the scanty pasturage disappeared.
—and died—by the fate of their herds.

The Kazakhs lived

Those who resisted—and such

resistance was widespread, violent, and organized—were killed.
12

OGPU/NKVD forces operated in the Steppe as late as 1938.

Special
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The Kazakhs fled in vast numbers, tens to hundreds of thousands to
China and Turkestan; many perished of hardship.

Kazakh herdsmen

slaughtered their animals wholesale to keep them from the confiscators
and collective camps.

Considering the special, loving relationship

between the Kazakh people and their animals, one can only imagine the
suffering this caused them.

By 1930 only, one-third of the Kazakh herds

had been killed (meaning ten million sheep, over two million cattle);
though the slaughtering abated after 1932, herd size did not recover until
the 1960s.

The number of Kazakh households fell from over 1,200,000 in

1929 to 565,000 in 1936; 400,000 households were settled from 1930 to
1937 (the remainder were wholly nomadic families wandering the central
Kazakh Steppe); the seven-year age group was but 40% in size of the
11-year olds, and could have been 160% without this tragedy.

13

Of those

Kazakhs who were "settled" by 1933, over 100,000 were otkochevniki,
"former nomads" who had fled the collectives to wander the Steppe in
utter destitution; this return of Kazakhs to the Steppe to escape
civilization recalls the very origins of the Kazakhs as "free riders of
the Steppe"—and they can be regarded as the ironic end of Qazaqjylyq.
The period 1928-1938 encompassed the destruction of the Kazakh
masses, the traditional leadership, and the nationalists.

Whereas

collectivization itself physically liquidated the former two, the latter
were destroyed in a series of purges, especially in the years 1928,
1932, and 1937-38.

14

The failures of the

f 20s

campaigns and the

persistence of Kazakh nomadism, as well as Stalin's attacks on "national
deviationists" and especially on Moslem national Communism, provided
the regime with the excuse to eliminate the nationalists once and for all.
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The following list of executed Kazakh leaders is merely partial, to
provide the end of the story of their lives and struggle:

Ahmed

Baytursun, killed in 1937 (aged 64); Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, 1932 (63);
Mir Jaqib Dulatov, 1937 (52); Turar Ryskulov, 1937 (43); Saken Seifullin,
1939 (45); Magzhan Zhumabayev, 1937 (43).

Hundreds of others, the first

Kazakh Bolsheviks and earliest Communist cadres, were purged during this
period also.

Thus, by 1939, the Soviet regime had thoroughly crushed all

Kazakh opposition—Kazakh herdsmen, aksakals, and nationalists all met
the same violent fate.
Modern Kazakh nationalism was the development of Kazakh nomad
nationalism under the influence of modernization.

The "free riders of the

Steppe" from beginning to end, traditional or modern, clerical or secular,
northern or southern, moderate or radical, always identified themselves as
a proud, unique nation.

The nature of Kazakh nationalism is constant;

only its manifestation is transitory.

Kazakh nomadism itself has

survived in the so-called "roving economy" (otgon or otgonnoye
zhivotnovodstvo), though no longer, of course, free.*^

And recent unrest

in Kazakhstan (student riots in 1987 in Alma Ata, anti-minority violence
in 1989 in Mangyshlak) indicate that nationalism still exists also.
Kazakh history is symbolic of the history of pastoral nomadism in
the modern world.

The inexorable mutation of society by modernization,

in the case of the Kazakhs, has meant denomadization but not annihilation.
The dream of Qazaqjylyq goes on.
"The Steppe is cruel, and Heaven is far."
&
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THE KAZAKH KHANATE

1468-80

Janibek (son of Barak, Uzbek Khan)

1480-88

Kirai (brother of Janibek):

1488-1511

Buyunduk (son of Kirai)

1511-23

Qasym (greatest Khan)

1523-33

Tahir (Qasym T s nephew)

1533-38

Buidashe

1538-80

Haq Nazar (son of Qasym):

1580-82

Shigai (Tahir's nephew)

1586-98

Taulkel (son of Shigai)

1598-1628

Esim

first elected Khan

formation of Three Zhuzes (Hordes)

1643-80 (?) Jangir (Esim's son)
1680-17 11

Tauke (Jangir T s son):

1718-49

Abulkhair (Abu ! 1 Khayr): Middle and Little Hordes only

1723

aqtaban shubirindi

1731

Abulkhair T s oath to Russian tsar:

1732

Middle Horde T s Semeke 1 s oath to tsar

1740-81

Sultan Ablai (Middle Horde):

1740

Ablai's oath to tsar (resurgent Dzhungar threat)

1756/59

Great Horde claimed by Manchu China (occupying Dzhungaria)

1801

Bukey or Inner Horde created by Tsar Paul

1808

Kokand conquers Tashkent and western Great Horde

1818, 1824, 1847

codified Kazakh law (Jhety Jharga)

end of independent Khanate

last great Kazakh Khan

remaining Great Horde leaders' oaths to tsar

1822

Middle Horde Khanate abolished

1824

Little Horde Khanate abolished

1837-48

Kenesary Kasymov's revolt:

1845

Inner Horde Khanate abolished

1848

Great Horde Khanate abolished

1865

Russian conquest of Tashkent:

1868-70

last 19th-century Kazakh mass uprisings, against Steppe Statute
Figure 4.
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last pan-Khanate independence revolt

Russian rule of all Kazakhs
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POPULATION STATISTICS FOR TSARIST KAZAKHSTAN, 1897-1916*
Total
1897
T955
TjfiS

Kazakhs Russians Total
J,312
W~ I7TZ5
3,564
987
5,000
3,768
1,868
6,471

Ural'sk Oblast

TS4

S46

477
480

268
278

769
854

Syr Darya Obi.
742
21
836
790?
23?
880?
846?
25? 1,166

Steppe Oblasts
1,903
493
2,467
2,074
844
2,978
2,179
1,548
4,206
By Uezch
Ural'sk
Kazakhs Russians
1897
151
125
191(3
77
165

4S0

Lbishchensk
144
133

22;:
70

Turgay

Irglz
97
117

1
3

86

1

110

2

Pavlodar

Atbasar
75

11

143

U

104

58

162

93

Kopal

Lepsinak

156

22

139

78

Chimkent
225
257?

126
172

15

26

Omsk
38
39

55
176

Semipalatinsk
122
112

27
34

Dzharkent
9
41

Perovsk
130
148?

Gur'yev
71
124

1
?

82
87

6
16

Turgai Oblast
411
35
454
440
120
567
507
305
856

Akmolinsk Obi,
427
22S
582
488
374
880
527
765 1,567

Semirechye Obi,

Semipalatinsk Obi,

657
700?
743

82

120?
880?
295 1,099

Temir
94
146

58

585"

669
665

82
200

762
929

Kustanay
118

29

17

154

200

77
169

Ust1Kamengorsk
81
21
100
52

Kokchetav
79
97

68
255

Zaisan

89
100

5
17

Piahpek

Vernyi
151
176

605

1

Petropavlovsk
69
108

84?

35
76

152
169

12
84

Aktyubinsk

110
4
126 100
Akmolinsk
166
179

15
107

Karkaralinsk
170
191
Aulie-Ata
251

11

286?

Kazalinsk

Total Kazakhs in Russia or USSR
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1897: 3.8 million
11
1911: 4.0
1926: 4.0
"

155

1939:
1959:
1970:
1979:

?

3.1 million
3.6
»
5.2
»

6.6

"

*Based on Demko, Russian Colonization, & Krader, Peoples (statistics passim). The statistics do not include
Kazakhs of Astrakhan, Transcaspia, Orenburg, Siberia, or China, Semirechye stats, exclude Przhevalsk
uezd: Syr Darya excludes Tashkent & Petro-Alexandrovsk uezds. All numbers in thousands. Totals include
Kazakhs, Russians (incl, Ukrainians & Byelorussians), and "others" (Dungans, Uzbeks, Jews, Tatars, etc,)
Figure 8.
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NOTES

Introduct ion
1. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "The History
of the Kazakh Press, 1900-1920," Central Asian Review 14, 2 (1966): 161;
Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Studies of Nationalities in the USSR
Series, Hoover Press Publication 338 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford University, 1987), p. 255,
Chapter One:

The Free Horsemen of the Steppe

1. Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 20.
2. The main sources on pastoral nomadism are: Elizabeth E. Bacon,
"Types of Pastoral Nomadism in Central and Southwest Asia," Southwestern
Journal of Anthropology 10 (1954): 44-68; Leslie Dienes, "Pasturalism in
Turkestan: Its Decline and Its Persistence," Soviet Studies 27, 3 (July
1975): 343-65; Alfred E. Hudson, Kazak Social Structure (New Haven, CN:
Yale University Press, 1938); A. M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Lawrence Krader,
"The Ecology of Nomadic Pastoral ism," International Social Science
Journal 11, 4 (Dec. 1959): 499-510; Krader, The Peoples of Central Asia
(Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1966); Krader, Social
Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads (The Hague: Mouton and
Co., 1963); "Seasonal Nomadism," Central Asian Review 4, 3 (1956): 226-38;
"The Social Structure and Customs of the Kazakhs," Central Asian Review
5, 1 (1957): 5-25; and Wolfgang Weissleder, ed., The Nomadic Alternative:
Modes and Models of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and Steppes
(The Hague: Mouton, 1978).
3. The main sources on geography are listed in the Bibliography.
4. The best source on the natural habitat of Kazakhstan is Neil E.
West, ed., Temperate Deserts and Semi-Deserts (Ecosystems of the World 5)
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing, 1983), pp. 3-236, and
especially Chap. 4, "Semi-Deserts and Deserts of Central Kazakhstan," by
H. Walter and E. 0. Box, pp. 43-78.
5. In Russian, Tselinnyi krai.
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6. The central uplands are described in Sergei P. Suslov, The
Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman,
1961), 175 f f.
7. "Kirghiz Steppe" because the Russians changed "Kazakh" to
"Kirghiz" to prevent confusion between the Russian kazaks (Cossacks) and
the Turkic kazaks (Kazakhs), spelled identically in Cyrillic. "SaryArka (Arqa)" literally means "Yellow Back," and is descriptive of the
grassland-watershed; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Press," p. 16 In.
8. Dzheti Su, medieval Moghulistan, was chronicled by none other
than Vasili Bartold in The History of Semirechye, in Vol. 1 of Four
Studies on the History of Central Asia, 3 vols, transl. by V. and T.
Minorsky (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1956-62), originally
written in 1893.
9. Elizabeth E. Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study
in Culture Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 1.
10. Bacon, Central Asians, p. 2; Frank Trippett et al., The First
Horsemen, Emergence of Man Series (New York: Time-Life Books, 1974),
pp. 9, 58, 74-9, 155; Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 85-118.
11. Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 86-88, 94-95, argues persuasively that the
climatic change recorded in the 1000s B.C. was primarily responsible.
12. Khazanov, an expert on the Scythians, uses this fact of 'panhistorical 1 similarity to prove that pastoral nomadism is basically
stagnant economically and culturally (pp. 69ff).
13. The numerous sources on pastoral nomadism, especially of the
Kazakhs, detail this dependence at length; e.g., Khazanov, Nomads, p. 38.
Also, one finds ample descriptions of Kazakh diet in various travellers 1
works; e.g., E. Nelson Fell, Russian and Nomad: Tales of the Kirghiz
Steppes (New York: Duffield, 1916), pp. 49-51.
14. Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 73-4, notes that 19th century Kazakhstan
suffered major dzhuts, with losses of 50-75% of the herds, every 6-11
years, and local dzhuts annually, and quotes the Mongol proverb, "One
jute [dzhut] suffices the rich man, and one arrow the hero." Richard
A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-19 17: A Study in Colonial Rule
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p. 154, mentions the
disastrous winters of 1879-80 and 189 1-92, in Turgay oblast; in the
first, one-half of the 3k million livestock perished, and in the second,
47% of the horses, 32% of the cattle, sheep, and goats, and 22% of the
camels were lost. Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 92, states that the 1879-80
winter was called "The Great Jut," and besides the Turgay losses, notes
that 800,000 cattle died in Akmolinsk oblast. Also cf. P. Alampiev,
Soviet Kazakhstan (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 30;
Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (New York:
Praeger, p. 34.
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15. Owen Lattimore, High Tartary (Boston: Little, Brown, 1930),
p. 245, calls grain the "staple luxury" of nomads. Khazanov, Nomads,
pp. 52-53, discusses Kazakh diet.
16. The primary English-language source is Thomas Winner, The Oral
Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1958).
17. Gavin Hambly, ed., Central Asia (New York:
Dell Publishing, 1969), pp. 12-13.

Chapter Two:

Delacorte Press,

Kazakhstan and the Tsars

1. Major historical sources are listed in the Bibliography.
2. Frank Bessac, "Co-variation between Interethnic Relations and
SOcial Organization in Inner Asia," Papers of the Michigan Academy of
Science, Arts, and Letters 50 (1965): 380.
3. The etymology of kazak (qazaq) is disputed. Cf. William Allen,
The Ukraine: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940),
pp. 68-70, 250; Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and
Stalinism, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 38n, 4243; George V. Lantzeff and Richard A. Pierce, Eastward to Empire:
Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier, to 1750 (Montreal:
McGill-Queen f s University Press, 1973), pp. 73-75; Owen Lattimore, Pivot
of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), pp. 128-9, and High Tartary, p. 244;
Philip Longworth, The Cossacks (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1969), pp. 14, 342-44; Hudson, Kazak, pp. 13-14.
4. For anthropological perspective on nomads and sociopolitical
development, compare Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968) with Marshall Sahlins, Tribesmen
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968). Also see Bessac, "Co
variation," pp. 375-83.
5. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Press," p. 157n; Olcott,
The Kazakhs, pp. 4, 11, 110; Wheeler, p. 101.
6. Krader, Format ion, pp. 82-103.
7. Ernest Gellner, "Foreword," in Khazanov, Nomads, pp. xiv-xxii.
Cf. V. F. Shakhmatov, "The Basic Characteristics of the Kazakh
Patriarchal Feudal State Organization," translated as "Feudalism in
Kazakhstan," Central Asian Review 9, 2 (1961): 126-33.
8. An example of this is the custom of saun.

As part of the duties
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of wealthier Kazakhs to support poorer kinsmen, saun was the free loan of
milk-animals for sustenance. Eventually, the recipient was expected to
repay the loan with labor. Soviet critics thus portrayed saun as a
system of economic exploitation. E.g., Central Asian Review, "Social
Structure and Customs," p. 7.
9. Tolybekov is discussed extensively in Ernest Gellner's Foreword
in Khazanov, Nomads, pp. xviii-xxiv. His article "The Reactionary
Struggle of the Kazakh Sultans and Batyrs of the Lesser Horde against
Voluntary Union with Russia" is appears in translation as "Russia and the
Kazakhs in the 18th Century," Central Asian Review 3, 4 (1955): 269-76.
10. Ethnographic sources are listed under "Nomadism" in the
Bibliography.
11. Orda and zhuz are discussed in Hudson, Kazak Social Structure,
pp. 14-15; Krader, Peoples of Central Asia, p. 92; and Hambly, ed.,
Central Asia, p. 143; and Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 10-11.
12. Wheeler, Modern History, pp. 33-4; Hambly, ed., Central Asia,
p. 143; Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 24.
13. Hambly, ed., Central Asia, pp. 145-46; George J. Demko, The
Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916, Uralic and Altaic Series,
No. 96 (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1969), p. 37;
Edward Allworth, "Encounter," in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A
Century of Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
p. 48; Olcott, Kazakhs, 26-7, 45; I. Zlatkin, "The History of the
Khanate offfzhungaria," Central Asian Review 13, 1 (1965): 17-30.
14. E. B. Bekhmakhanov, "The Annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia,"
Central Asian Review 6, 4 (1958): 408-14; N. V. Gorban, "From the History
of the Construction of Forts in the South of Western Siberia: The New
Ishim Fortified Line," Soviet Geography 25, 3 (March 1984):
177-94;
Ihor Stebelsky, "The Frontier in Central Asia," Russian Historical
Geography I (1983): 151.
15. Lattimore, High Tartary, p. 113; Hambly, ed., Central Asia,
p. 144. The Dzhungar population, perhaps 600,000, was literally
slaughtered by the Manchus, in 1759; only a few escaped. (Zlatkin,
Dzhungaria, 29-30.
16. The best accounts of the Russian conquest are in Allworth,
"Encounter," pp. 1-59; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, pp. 187-226; Olcott,
Kazakhs, 28-53; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 17-45, 147.
17. A. Chuloshnikov, "The Kazakh-Kirgiz Nomadic Hordes and Pugachev f s
Rebellion, 1773-1774," trans, as "The Kazakhs and Pugachev's Revolt,"
Central Asian Review 8, 3 (1960): 256-63; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, p.
189; Allworth, "Encounter," 10, 49-50.
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18. Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 97-100; Hambly, ed., Central Asia,
p. 148.
19. Allworth, "Encounter," p. 50; Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 36, 100,
125-26; Krader, Soc ial Organizat ion, pp. 192, 237-8, 253; Michael Rywkin,
Russia in Central Asia (New York: Collier, 1963). p. 18; Wheeler, Modern
History, p. 12.
20. Allworth, "Encounter," pp. 10-14; Olcott, Kazakhs, 62-67; Caroe,
Soviet Empire, pp. 74-5, 181, 224, 236; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, p. 199;
Krader, Peoples, 101, 107, 162; Wheeler, Modern History, pp. 53-5, 90, 94,
210, 240-1.
21. Major sources for the tsarist administration of the Kazakhs are
Allworth, ed., Central Asia, chapters by Allworth ("Encounter"), pp. 4757, and Helene Carrere d ! Encausse ("Systematic Conquest, 1865-1884" and
"Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories"), pp. 13 1-7 1; Bacon,
Central Asians, 92-103, Krader, Peoples, pp. 97-108; Olcott, Kazakhs,
pp. 57-99; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 46-91, 141-52; Wheeler, Modern
History, 65-96.
22. Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 92-102; Hudson, Kazak, p. 16.

Chapter Three:

Russification as Modernization

1. Stephen Graham, Through Russian Central Asia (New York:
1916), pp. 183-4.

Macmillan,

2. Hudson, Kazak, p. 16; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, pp. 221-2; Demko,
Colonization, pp. 199-205; Rywkin, Russia, pp. 18, 77-81; Pierce, Russian
Central Asia, pp. 153-62; Caroe, Soviet Empire, pp. 162-72; Bacon, Central
Asians, pp. 92-102; Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union:
Communism and Nationalism 19 17-1923, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1964), pp. 6-7; Thomas G. Winner, The Oral Art and
Literature of the Kazakhs, pp. 19-24.
3. The most detailed account of Russian colonization is Demko 1 s
Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-19 16 (1969); see also "Russian
Military and Civilian Settlements, 1824-1917," Central Asian Review 6, 2:
(1958): 143-5 1; V. I. Shunkov, "Geographical Distribution of Siberian
Agriculture in the 17th Century, Part I," Soviet Geography 22, 9 (June
1981): 381-92; Ihor Stebelsky, "Ukrainian Peasant Colonization East of
the Urals, 1896-1914," Soviet Geography 25, 9 (Nov. 1984): 681-94;
Donald L. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant
in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1957); Geoffrey Wheeler, "Russian Conquest and
Colonization of Central Asia," in Taras Hunczak, ed., Russian Imperial ism
from Ivan the Great to the Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
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University Press, 1974), pp. 264-98; D. S. M. Williams, "Russian Peasant
Settlements in Semirech'ye," Central Asian Review 14, 2 (1966): 110-22.
4. Demko, Colonization, p. 121.
5. Detailed discussion of tsarist
in Violet Connolly, Beyond the Urals:
Asia (London: Oxford University Press,
"Industrialization," in Allworth, ed.,

industrialization in Kazakhstan is
Economic Development in Soviet
1967); Ian M. Matley,
Central Asia, pp. 309-48.

6. Demko, Colonization, pp. 145-9.
7. Statistics from Demko, Colonizat ion, 14 1.
8. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 83-99.
9. Analysis of the long relationship between Eurasian nomads and the
civilizations around them is the theme of William H. McNeill's Europe 1 s
Steppe Frontier (1500-1800) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
Essentially, gunpowder and the deep plow gave civilization the power to
conquer the Steppe nomads.
10. Description of such relationships abound in the ethnographic
sources; Lattimore witnessed it in the remote areas of Sinkiang he
visited in the 1920s-30s (Tartary, pp. 24 1, 244; Pivot, pp. 130, 156).
11. Demko, Colonizat ion, p. 179. In the four northern oblasts in
1916, the herds totalled 2,200,000 horses, 2,400,000 cattle, 500,000
camels, and 9,200,000 sheep and goats (Demko, Appendix Table H, p. 223).
12. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 93-4.
13. Ibid.

p. 93

14. Soviet scholars attributed the change in land tenure to the
usurpation by the "feudal nobility" of the land for their own gain;
however, land ownership among the Kazakhs was a sympton of modernization
and Russian economics, not of Marxist feudalism.
15. Khazanov, Nomads, p. 72.
16. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 18.
17. Edward Allworth, "The Changing Intellectual and Literary
Community," in Allworth, ed., Central Asia, pp. 349-96; Martha B. Olcott,
"The Emergence of National Identity in Kazakhstan," Canadian Review of
Studies in Nationalism 8, 2 (Fall 1981): 286; Olcott, Kazakhs, 100-09;
Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 203-220; Sergei Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism
and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960),
pp. 58-65.
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19. Olcott, "National Identity," 290-91,and Kazakhs, 101-04.
20. Pierce, pp. 205-10.
21. Allworth, "Intellectual," pp. 363-67; Helene Carrere d'Encausse,
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"Dzhadidism," vol. 10: 93-5; "Jadidism: A Current Soviet Assessment,"
Central Asian Review 12, 1 (1964): 30-9.
22. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, passim; Bennigsen and LemercierQuelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union, pp. 3-64; cf. Charles W. Hostler,
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Islam, p. 72; Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism, p. 222;
Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 136-7; d'Encausse, "Fall," 222-3, and "Civil War,"
p. 238; Sokol, Revolt of 1916, p. 70; Wieczynski, ed., Modern Encyclopedia,
Vol. 41: 125.
24. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Is1am, p. 85; d'Encausse,
"Civil War," pp. 226-7; Park, Bolshevism, pp. 15-17; Pipes, Format ion,
p. 92; Rywkin, Russia, p. 36; Wheeler, Modern History, pp. 104-07.
25. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, p. 163; d'Encausse, "Civil
War," pp. 236-7; Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 138-40; Pipes, Formation, p. 86;
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27. D'Encausse, "Fall," p. 223; Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, pp. 212-15.
28. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 144.
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49. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim Natinal Communism, p. 213; Olcott,
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Conclusion
1. Quoted in Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 183.
2. Quoted in Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 165.
3. The intention is only to summarize Kazakh history to 1939. By
Sovietization is meant the combination of industrialization, Russification,
and Soviet Communism. Major sources for the period 1920-39 include many
of the comprehensive works already cited, and others found under "Soviet
Era" in the History section of the Bibliography.
4. Pipes, Format ion, p. 174; Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 160.
5. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 211-12.
6. Ibid., 173.
7. Ibid., 205-9; Martha B. Olcott, "The Collectivization Drive in
Kazakhstan," The Russian Review 40, 2 (April 1981):
140.
8. A major contribution to the study of this era rarely touched on
elsewhere is Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women
and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 19 19-1929 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974). The khudzhum is discussed on pp.
226-46, 259-84, 322-35. Also, see Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 171-2, 196.
9. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 171-3, 203, 206-7.
10. Olcott, "Collectivization," p. 125; Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 165-8.
11. Olcott, "Collectivization," is the best source. Also, see Robert
Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the TerrorFamine , pp. 189-98, 297, 305-6.
12. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 185.
13. Ibid., pp. 181-7; Conquest, Harvest, 296-7.
14. Sources for nationalists' fates listed in their notes above.
15. Irene Winner, "Some Problems of Nomadism and Social Organization
among the Recently Settled Kazakhs," Central Asian Review 11, 4 (1963):
256-60.
Also, see "Stabilization of the Nomads," Central Asian Review
7, 3 (1959): 221-9.
16. Proverb quoted in Ralph Fox, Peoples of the Steppes (London:
Constable Press, 1925), p. 43.
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